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ABSTRACT 
The Superannuation Guarantee legislation has made many Australian employees 
compulsory investors. The reality that many Australian employees are failing to save 
adequate retirement benefits highlights the importance of selecting an appropriate 
superannuation investment strategy. With a majority of members having their employer-
sponsored contributions in Defined Contribution Funds, it is ultimately members who 
are responsible for making investment decisions. Given that Australian employees are 
faced with myriad investment options, it is opportune to examine how members are 
exercising investment choice. A key factor for a member to consider is whether their 
investment strategy should be influenced by their age. 
Using the member asset allocation data from four of Australia's larger superannuation 
funds (HESTA, STA, GESB, and UniSuper), this thesis provides an empirical 
investigation of a sample of members' investment strategy decisions and key 
demographics, notably age. This thesis also presents an overview of life-cycle funds, an 
emerging product in the superannuation industry. General comparisons between existing 
life-cycle funds in terms of asset allocations, cost structures, and investment strategy, 
allow for an understanding of the range of funds available. 
Several key findings emerge. There is a considerable amount of variation among 
the life-cycle products being offered in the United States and Australia. A comparison 
of the asset allocation weights between the Australian life-cycle products and the default 
investment options of Australian superannuation funds reveals that life-cycle products 
decrease individuals' exposure to growth assets very early in the life-cycle. Age has a 
significant relationship with the portfolio decisions, equity participation and equity 
allocation. When additional member characteristics are taken into account including 
gender, marital status, and risk profile, the relative importance of the age factor 
diminishes significantly. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Superannuation fund assets now total $945.6 billion (Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, 2006). Superannuation has played an increasingly important role 
in the managed funds industry in the past two decades, due to a significant restructuring 
of Australia's retirement income policy in the 1980's and 1990's (AXISS Australia, 
2004). 
Prior to the introduction of a number of compulsory superannuation initiatives in 
the late 1980's and early 1990's, a majority of fund members were in a Defined Benefit 
Fund (DBF) (Drew & Stanford, 2003). In a DBF, the employer bears the risk of 
investments and promises to fund a defined benefit upon retirement, usually in terms of 
an employee's final salary and years of employment. That is, the employer increases 
contributions when investment returns are low, and decreases contributions when 
investment returns are high (AXISS Australia, 2004). In contrast, a member in a 
Defined Contribution Fund (DCF) has an individual account where their balance varies 
with the investment choice and movements in the market. 
The beginnings of compulsory superannuation were initially introduced in 
Australia in 1986 through 'Award Super,' which required many employees to accept a 
minimum three percent superannuation contribution in exchange for foregoing a wage 
increase (AXISS Australia, 2004). The introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee 
(Administration) Act 199i made many more Australian employees compulsory 
investors and was largely responsible for mass compulsory superannuation coverage, 
with coverage increasing from approximately 40 percent in the 1980's to over 90 
percent in recent years (Drew & Stanford, 2003). 
Under the Superannuation Guarantee legislation, it is mandatory for employers 
to make contributions of a specified proportion of wage and salaries to a complying 
superannuation fund, on behalf of employees2• Employees who are under the age of 70 
and are earning more than $450 per calendar month are eligible for superannuation 
1 Generally referred to as the Superannuation Guarantee (SG) legislation. 
2 Payments must be made at least quarterly. 
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guarantee contributions3. The minimum contribution levy was originally set at three 
percent in 1992, and has progressively increased to the current rate of nine percent. 
Australia's current superannuation system has shifted to one that is characterised 
by compulsion and DCF structures. DCF's became increasingly attractive to both 
employers and employees. For employers, DCF's are preferable as DBF contribution 
requirements may exceed the minimum contribution level required by SG legislation to 
maintain benefit levels. Such schemes offer practicality to employees, especially those 
who regularly transfer between jobs (AXISS Australia, 2004). As a result of this trend 
towards DCF 's, investment risk is now being borne by members to a large extent. The 
operation of DCF's is similar to a bank account, whereby employees are paid at least 
nine percent of their annual salary into a superannuation account. The retirement benefit 
consists of the accumulated values of these contributions, taking into consideration any 
profits/losses determined by market movements. Thus, the key difference between 
DBF's and DCF's is who bears the investment risk. At present, 62 percent of 
superannuation fund assets are in DCF's, and approximately three percent of 
superannuation fund assets are in DBF's, with the balance in hybrid schemes 
(Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 2006, p. 16). 
A recent change to Australia's current superannuation system was the 
Commonwealth choice of fund legislation4, which took effect from 1 July 2005. Under 
this legislation, employer contributions are directed to a complying superannuation fund 
of the employee's choice. From a potential 9.5 million employees, approximately 5.2 
million additional employees gained the right to choose their superannuation fund upon 
the introduction of the choice of fund legislation (Clare, 2005). 
Another choice being offered to members is within-fund investment choice. The 
Australian superannuation industry has followed a global trend of investment choice 
expansion. For many, this has resulted in greater choice and control over the allocation 
of pension assets (Gallery, Gallery, & Brown, 2004), catering for a wider range of 
individual risk-return preferences. 
The Superannuation Guarantee legislation has made Australian employees 
compulsory investors. With a majority of members having their employer-sponsored 
3 The SG obligation does not apply to (1) self-employed persons; (2) employees earning less than $450 
per calendar month; and (3) employees aged 70 or over. 
4 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Fund) Act 2004 
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contributions in DCF's, it is ultimately members who are responsible for making 
investment decisions. Given that Australian employees are faced with myriad 
investment options, it is opportune to examine how members are exercising investment 
choice. 
1.1. Retirement Investment Strategy and Age 
A key factor for a member to consider is whether their investment strategy 
should be influenced by their age. A popular rule of thumb with respect to retirement 
investing is that the proportion of an individual's portfolio invested in equities should be 
equal to 100 minus the investor's age (Bodie & Crane, 1997). Thus, a person who is 40 
years old should invest 60% in equities, and a person who is 60 years old should invest 
40% in equities. This strategy can be referred to as age-phasing, whereby individuals 
reduce their exposure to risky assets as they become older. 
In response to the perceived desire of investors to reduce their equity exposure 
within their investment portfolio as they age, and to address the problems of inertia in 
retirement asset allocation portfolio decisions, "life-cycle" funds (also known as "target-
date" funds) have been created (Poterba, Rauh, Venti, & Wise, 2005, p. 2). Such funds 
"are one of the most rapidly growing financial products of the last decade," (Poterba, 
Rauh, Venti, & Wise, 2005, p. 2). 
Consistent with the concept of age-phasing, the main idea of a life-cycle fund is 
to reallocate investments over time to be more conservative. Life-cycle funds are 
managed funds that automatically reduce the exposure to more volatile asset classes, 
primarily equity, as an investor ages. In choosing a life-cycle fund an investor selects an 
appropriate target-date which refers to an individual's expected year of retirement. The 
exposure to growth assets will gradually decrease until this particular date when asset 
allocation will become most conservative. 
Life-cycle funds first emerged in the U.S. investment environment during the 
mid-1990s, and have experienced a significant amount of growth in recent years. At the 
end of 2002, the U.S. target-date fund population had a total $15 billion in assets under 
management. Over the three years to 2005, this grew to a total $70 billion in assets 
under management. In addition to the significant growth of life-cycle funds in the 
United States over the last decade, Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) note that the proliferation 
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of age-phasing advice has stimulated interest among academics in at least two 
questions: (1) should individuals follow this advice and reduce their exposure to risk as 
they age, and (2) do individuals actually follow this advice. This paper is concerned 
with the second question, which will be investigated in the context of member choices 
of four large Australian superannuation funds. 
1.2. Research Contribution and Questions 
The key contribution of this thesis is the survey of life-cycle funds which is an 
emerging product in the superannuation industry. Being an emerging product, very little 
information about life-cycle funds is available in Australia. Some recent U.S. based 
studies have briefly referred to life-cycle products. A recent paper published by the 
Boston-based Financial Research Corporation (FRC)5 is the only known study that 
provides a comprehensive treatment of these products and is solely U.S. based. General 
comparisons between existing life-cycle funds in terms of asset allocations, cost 
structures, and investment strategy, will allow for an understanding of the range of 
funds available, and to determine whether there is consistency among these products. 
This thesis provides a comparison of a sample of individual superannuation 
member asset allocation decisions at different ages with existing life-cycle products. 
This will provide information on asset allocation patterns of members over the life-
cycle, allowing for some evidence as to the potential suitability of the application of 
life-cycle funds in Australia. 
Second, this thesis contributes to the existing empirical literature concernmg 
life-cycle asset allocation. A study of this nature is important to Australia as most of the 
empirical literature is limited to the U.S. Even in the U.S., few empirical studies 
examine life-cycle patterns in portfolio choice until recently, partly due to a lack of 
detailed data (Ameriks & Zeldes, 2004). The asset allocation decision is one that is 
significant to all investors who must choose how to apportion total portfolio wealth to 
various asset classes. Superannuation members face a number of risks, which include 
(Rice Walker Actuaries, 2006, p. 2): 
5 Lifecycle Fund Economics: Evaluating Next Generation Competitive Dynamics (FRC, 2006). This 
study provides discussion relating to the growth oflife-cycle funds, life-cycle fund differentiators (i.e. key 
investment-related and marketing features), the distribution landscape for life-cycle funds, life-cycle 
product economies, life-cycle portfolio growth in alternative product strategies (e.g. variable annuity 
products and 529 college savings plans), and success factors in the life-cycle fund market. 
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" Employer-contributions will be insufficient to fund an adequate retirement 
benefit; 
111 Retirement savings will not earn sufficient returns to generate a reasonable 
retirement benefit; 
111 Disposable income will not increase in the immediate period before retirement, 
resulting in an inability to top-up retirement savings; and 
1111 Taking an early retirement and thus losing a few years of retirement savings 
accumulation and having a few extra years of consumption. 
The above risks, in addition to the reality that approximately one fifth of 
Australia's semi and fully retired population aged over 55 have failed to save for 
retirement (Egan, 2006), highlights the fact that selecting an appropriate superannuation 
investment strategy is one of the most important financial decisions members can make. 
In terms of research methodology, a majority of studies have not distinguished 
between the two portfolio decisions of equity participation and equity allocation. 
Following Ameriks & Zeldes (2004), these two portfolio decisions were modelled 
separately, accounting for the reality that many superannuation members are not 
exposed to any level of equity at all. Also, some studies [see for example, Bodie & 
Crane (1997); Schooley & Worden (1999)] have employed the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) procedure to estimate the general relationship between age and equity allocation. 
This approach was not used in this thesis. Instead, the Probit and Tobit procedures were 
employed in working with limited dependent variables to compensate for the boundaries 
at zero and one for equity participation and zero and 100 for the share of equity held in a 
portfolio. 
Finally, this thesis offers some conclusions about the relative importance of the 
age variable in explaining equity ownership and equity allocation when additional 
member characteristics are taken into account. This thesis is of relevance to fund 
trustees, fund members, regulators, and employers. 
First, under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, fund trustees 
are solely responsible and directly accountable for the prudential management of the 
investment of an entity's assets. One of the key duties of fund trustees is to ensure that 
their powers are exercised in the best interests of the members. This includes the 
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optimal construction and management of investment menus with members' interests in 
mind. The discussion regarding life-cycle funds in this thesis will provide a helpful 
information source for fund trustees who may be considering offering life-cycle 
products. 
Second, superannuation fund members themselves who are interested in 
assistance beyond their default investment option will find this thesis useful. It will 
allow them to compare their own asset allocation behaviour with that of other 
Australian superannuation members, and expose them to (or increase their awareness 
of) life-cycle funds. 
Third, this thesis will assist funds in the creation of new products to cater for 
specific investor needs, for example life-cycle investing. The summary of 
superannuation member asset allocations and estimated sensitivities will be particularly 
helpful to funds, in gauging the potential demand for products that support an age-based 
investment strategy. 
Finally, this thesis will provide information to employers in assessing whether or 
not to offer life-cycle products to their employees. 
This thesis addresses the following questions: 
1. What is the status of the life-cycle funds markets in the United States and 
Australia? 
2. What does the investment literature and financial planning industry suggest 
investors should do with their portfolio allocation as they age? 
3. Using a sample of member choices from four large Australian superannuation 
funds, how different are actual asset allocations to the life-cycle products 
available? 
4. How does age affect the likelihood of stock ownership in super accounts and 
conditional on stock ownership, how does age affect the allocation of stock 
within superannuation accounts? 
5. Using additional demographic data, how important is age relative to other 
member characteristics in explaining equity ownership and equity allocation in 
member investment choices? 
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1.3. Findings Overview 
Four key findings emerge from this thesis. First, there is a considerable amount 
of variation among the life-cycle products being offered in the United States and 
Australia, especially in terms of asset allocation structure, expense structure, and 
investment strategy. Second, a comparison of the asset allocation weights between the 
Australian life-cycle products and the default investment options of Australian 
superannuation funds reveals that life-cycle products decrease individuals' exposure to 
growth assets very early in the life-cycle. The ultimate risk of an under-allocation to 
growth assets is an insufficient superannuation benefit upon retirement. Adopting life-
cycle funds as a default option could exacerbate this risk. Third, the age variable does 
have a significant relationship with equity participation and equity allocation. The two 
key trends exhibited are hump-shaped and negative linear age-ownership and age-
allocation profiles. Fourth, when additional member characteristics are taken into 
account including gender, marital status, and risk profile, the relative importance of the 
age factor diminishes significantly. 
1.4. Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature concerning life-cycle asset allocation (age-phasing). 
Next, a survey oflife-cycle funds is presented. Chapter 4 describes the data and research 
methods employed. Chapter 5 presents and discusses the findings. Chapter 6 provides 
concluding comments with suggestions for relevant parties. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The notion of "age-phasing" refers to the reduction in risky assets over the life-
cycle. There is much debate surrounding age-phasing. On one hand, financial 
practitioners frequently advise their clients to shift their investments away from stocks 
(towards bonds or other fixed interest securities) as they age. Alternatively, investments 
theory has argued that individuals should invest a constant proportion of their portfolios 
in equities regardless of age. More recently, there has been increasing interest in this 
topic, as the existing theoretical and empirical literature provides conflicting views. 
2.1. Theoretical Literature 
2.1.1. Modern Portfolio Theory 
Markowitz (1952) introduces the basic concepts of what today is referred to as 
modem portfolio theory. His paper is the first to offer a mathematical formalisation of 
the idea of diversification of investments: the mathematical version of "the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts," (Rubinstein, 2002, p. 1042). 
Characterised by rational investment behaviour and uncertainty, Markowitz 
(1952, p. 77) expresses that in making portfolio decisions, investors are concerned with 
both risk and return, and the discounting of "anticipated" or "expected" returns. 
Markowitz (1952, p. 79) introduces the "expected returns-variance of returns" (mean-
variance) rule, postulating that an investor should maximise expected portfolio return 
while minimising portfolio variance of return (or alternatively, minimise variance for a 
given level of expected return). Portfolios fulfilling these criteria are described as being 
"efficient" (Markowitz, 1952, p. 82). 
Markowitz distinguishes between the attainable set of portfolios and the efficient 
set of portfolios. The efficient frontier is defined as the set of Pareto optimal expected 
return, variance of return combinations (Markowitz, 1991, p. 470). The attainable set 
(opportunity set) of portfolios is the entire set of portfolios that could be found from a 
group of n securities. However, as the law of large numbers cannot be applied to a 
portfolio of securities, and because returns from securities are too intercorrelated, 
diversification cannot eliminate all risk. 
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As stated by Rubinstein, the most significant feature of Markowitz's work was 
to "show that it is not a security's own risk that is important to an investor, but rather 
the contribution the security makes to the variance of his entire portfolio" (2002, p. 
1042). Thus, the decision to include a particular security in one's portfolio should not be 
made by comparing the security's expected return and variance to other securities. 
Rather, one should consider the expected return and variance of the whole portfolio of 
securities which includes the security in question. 
The above basic elements set the foundation for modem portfolio theory. The 
next section deals with extensions of Markowitz's early work on portfolio selection. 
2.1.2. Optimal Lifetime Asset Allocation 
The existing literature contains myriad theoretical justifications both for and 
against this concept, commonly referred to as "age-phasing." 
Samuelson (1969), Merton (1969) and Mossin (1968) demonstrate that subject 
to a set of assumptions individuals should invest a constant proportion of their portfolios 
in equities regardless of age. The key assumptions of their models include: (1) time 
additive and separable utility; (2) identically and independently distributed returns (that 
is asset returns follow a random-walk); (3) frictionless and complete markets; (4) 
investors have constant relative risk aversion; and (5) investors have no labour income 
or non-tradeable assets. 
The models specified by Samuelson (1969), Merton (1969) and Mossin (1968) 
are multi-period models. According to Mossin, such models follow the structure that the 
investor still has the objective of maximising expected utility of wealth, with the added 
assumption that "the time between the present and his horizon can be subdivided into n 
periods (not necessarily the same length), at the end of each of which return on the 
portfolio held during the period materialises and he can make a new decision on the 
composition of the portfolio to be held during the next period," (1968, p. 220). 
Samuelson (1969) develops a generalised discrete-time model to examine the 
problem of optimal portfolio selection and consumption rules for an individual. He 
shows that the result of investing the same fraction in equities at all ages holds, despite 
the young person's increased opportunity to recoup any losses suffered earlier in the 
life-cycle. Also, Samuelson's analysis allows him to dispel the application of the law of 
large numbers to the portfolio allocation problem (1969, p. 245). Similarly, Merton 
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(1969) and Mossin (1968) explore the same problem in the context of a continuous-time 
model and arrive at the same conclusion as Samuelson (1969). 
Compared to the Markowitz static one-period framework, the multi-period 
models specified by Samuelson (1969), Merton (1969) and Mossin (1968) are more 
general and assume that individuals make choices dynamically over time (as opposed to 
making decisions "myopically") (Bodie & Crane, 1997, p. 14). 
Campbell, Cocco, Gomes, & Maenhout (1999, p. 3) point out that the 
assumptions held by Samuelson (1969), Merton (1969) and Mossin (1968) pose 
significant restrictions on the results derived. Much of the more recent empirical 
literature related to life-cycle asset allocation relaxes one or more of these assumptions. 
In contrast to the arguments against the reduction of risky assets over the life-
cycle, the following discussion identifies some authors' cases offered in support of age-
phasing. First, Samuelson's "escrow" argument suggests that altering the utility 
function to include a minimum subsistence level of wealth (while retaining the 
assumption of independent and identical probability distributions and ignoring human-
capital complications), provides an explanation for age-phased risk reduction (1989, p. 
9048). 
The reasoning behind the inclusion of this minimum subsistence level is that it 
reflects the reality that people save to ensure themselves (and their families) sufficient 
funds to satisfy minimum consumption requirements upon retirement (Samuelson, 
1989, p. 9048). To do this, an individual places a proportion of his wealth in a safe cash 
fund and the remaining is allocated in constant proportions between "risky" and "safe" 
assets. As time passes, "safe" assets (which includes the value of the escrow) become a 
larger proportion of aggregate assets ("risky" and "safe") (McNaughton, Piggot, & 
Purcal, 1999, p. 4). 
McNaughton, Piggot, & Purcal (1999) oppose Samuelson's (1989) "escrow" 
argument. In fact, they propose that escrow is likely to lead to an investment strategy 
whereby the proportion in risky assets actually increases over the life cycle. 
Alternatively, McNaughton, Piggot, & Purcal (1999, p. 3) demonstrate that for those 
people who accumulate their assets through the working phase of life, financial age-
phasing may be the result of a "saving rule". 
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To explain this further, this argument imposes the assumption of a firm saving 
habit, which may be something as simple as an individual saving $k per annum until 
retirement. At any point in time, the value of this stream of savings must be considered 
in calculating the fraction of the portfolio in hand to be invested in safe assets 
(McNaughton, Piggot, & Purcal, 1999, p. 5). As stated by McNaughton, Piggot, & 
Purcal (1999, p. 5), "if the Merton constant proportion rule is adopted, then age-phasing 
of the portfolio in hand will result, because the realised portfolio will exclude the value 
ofthe safe saving stream to come." 
As another case for age-phased risk reduction, Bodie, Merton, & Samuelson 
(1992) present the labour supply flexibility argument which incorporates continuous-
time portfolio theory, as popularised by Merton (1969). Their model considers two key 
components- financial wealth and human capital. Following Merton's continuous-time 
framework the market values of both wealth components (financial and human capital) 
change continuously and stochastically (Bodie, 2002, p. 4). Additionally, the wage rate 
.. 
(the return on human capital) exhibits perfect positive correlation with the market return 
on traded assets (Bodie, 2002, p. 4). 
At each point in time, individuals decide: (1) the amount of their consumption, 
(2) the proportion of their financial wealth to invest in risky assets (versus the safe 
asset), and (3) the portion of their maximum possible labour income that they will 
"spend" on leisure so as to maximise their discounted lifetime expected utility (Bodie, 
2002, p. 4). In other words, young individuals have more flexibility regarding their 
labour/leisure decisions (i.e. to increase labour and reduce leisure and consumption) to 
offset losses resulting from holding risky assets. Older individuals experience 
diminishing labour supply flexibility, thus they tend to decrease the risk in their 
investment portfolios as they near retirement. 
Finally, Samuelson (1991) and Kritzman (1994) suggest another argument, 
which is based on how individuals view movements in equity prices. Kritzman (1994) 
refers to this as the "time diversification" argument. In this case for age-phased 
reduction in equity, the assumption of identically and independently distributed returns 
is abandoned (i.e. asset returns do not follow a random-walk). Samuelson (1991) and 
Kritzman (1994) propose that asset returns exhibit mean reversion, which leads to 
increased risk-taking by those individuals who have long time horizons. The reasoning 
behind this argument is that, if asset returns are mean reverting, then above-average 
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returns tend to cancel out below-average returns over long horizons (Kritzman, 1994, p. 
14). That is, the younger a person is, the greater the individual's risk tolerance as a 
result of the belief in the chances of prices bouncing back from a low level 
(McNaughton, Piggot, & Purcal, 1999, p. 2). 
2.1.3. Asset Allocation and Annuitisation 
Investors facing longevity risk may prefer to annuitise wealth at retirement if 
annuity markets are sufficiently complete. However, this exposes investors to annuity 
risk That is, the utility derived from annuitised wealth may disappoint if market 
conditions turn out to be unfavourable at retirement (Koijen, Nijman, & Werker, 2006). 
Although the annuitisation of retirement savings is not as much of an issue for 
Australian Superannuation, as most members can take their retirement savings as a 
lump-sum, it is important to acknowledge the possibility that age-phasing patterns in 
asset allocation may be partly explained by the decision to convert retirement savings to 
an annuity. 
2.2. Empirical Literature 
2.2.1. Age-Specific Patterns in Asset Allocation 
The results of the study conducted by Schooley & Worden (1999, p. 41) 
provides general support of the notion that individuals base their portfolio decisions on 
their time horizons and risk tolerance. They identify a curvilinear relationship between 
age and the percentage of equity in a financial portfolio. That is, as an investor's age 
increases, so does the percentage of financial assets held in equities. This increase 
occurs at a decreasing rate, until at some point the percentage of assets invested in 
equities begins to decline. 
Yoo (1994), Poterba & Samwick (1997), and Agnew, Balduzzi, & Sunden 
(2003) identify similar patterns. Yoo (1994) uses cross-sectional data from the 1962 
Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers and the 1983 and 1986 Surveys of 
Consumer Finances (SCFs). Investigating the relation between age and risk exposure of 
individual portfolios, Yoo (1994) provides empirical results inconsistent with the 
behaviour prescribed by economic theory and financial practitioners. He identifies a 
"hump-shaped" pattern, noting that exposure to risky assets increases over the working 
life and decreases after retirement. Yoo's (1994) multiple regression results identify a 
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significant relationship between age and portfolio composition, supporting the non-
linear age patterns identified. 
It is important to note that in examining the relationship between age and equity 
allocations, each of the above studies does not specify regressions that are conditional 
on stock ownership. Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) note that because a significant portion of 
U.S. households do not hold any wealth in the stock market, there is a need to consider 
two choices: first, the decision of whether or not to own stock, and second, the decision 
of how much stock to hold conditional on ownership. 
In researching how portfolio allocation to equity varies with investor age, 
Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) acknowledge the existence of an identification problem with 
regard to age, time, and cohort effects. This inherent limitation relates to the reality that 
there is no way to separately identify the three effects without imposing further 
assumptions, as the age, time, and cohort variables do not change independently 
(Ameriks & Zeldes, 2004). Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) demonstrate that different 
interpretations based on a dataset are possible, depending on assumptions about age, 
time, or cohort effects. 
Poterba & Samwick (1997) use pooled cross-sectional data from the 1983, 1989 
and 1992 SCFs, to distinguish between age and cohort effects on the fraction of net 
worth allocated to various asset categories. They note a general increase in ownership 
and allocation of "all taxable equity" (i.e. directly held stock and stock mutual funds and 
brokerage accounts) until around age 43. After this point, the age profiles are relatively 
flat. Additionally, Poterba & Samwick (1997) find that there are practically no 
differences in the age profiles of ownership and allocation when cohort effects are 
included in the model. They conclude that, " ... households do not necessarily follow the 
popular finance advice to switch from stocks to bonds as they approach retirement" 
(Poterba & Samwick, 1997, p. 18). 
Agnew, Balduzzi, & Sunden (2003) model jointly the decision to hold equities 
and the decision of how much to hold, including age and time effects and excluding 
cohort effects in their regression specification. Their preliminary inspection of data 
reveals a hump-shaped pattern in equity allocations over the life cycle. Results from 
their initial censored multiple-regression analysis include that age has an overall 
negative effect on the share held in equities. In fact, they find that an additional year 
translates into a lower allocation to stocks by 93 basis points. Agnew, Balduzzi, & 
13 
Sunden (2003) also estimate a specification including both age and age squared, to 
capture possible non-linearity in the relation between equity allocation and age. The 
results identify that equity allocation peaks very early, at 32.5 years of age. 
Using cross-sectional data from a 1996 survey, Bodie & Crane (1997) examine 
the asset allocation behaviour of a group of TIAA-CREF participants. They provide 
evidence of a significant negative relationship between age and equity exposure in self-
directed retirement accounts. Bodie & Crane (1997) conclude that an additional year 
translates into a lower allocation to stocks by 0.6 percentage points (i.e. consistent with 
recommendations of financial practitioners). 
Brown, da Silva Rosa & McNaughton (2006) use a unique time-series data set 
(1974- 2005) consisting of trade-by-trade information on managed funds, in a study 
concerning the behaviour of Australian managed fund investors. Consistent with the 
lifecycle theory of investing, they find that older investors are more risk-averse than 
younger investors. To examine the effect of age on portfolio allocation, Brown, da Silva 
Rosa & McNaughton (2006) compare the split of investor-fund-days ("growth" and 
"conservative") between six age groups. They report that those individuals aged 
between 20 and 30 have 60.5% of their investor-fund-days in growth funds and 12.7% 
in "conservative." Those investors over 60 have only 46.2% of their investor-fund-days 
in "growth" and 24.8% in conservative. 
In examining the empirical relationship between age and portfolio choice, 
Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) employ pooled cross-sectional data from five waves of the 
SCFs between 1983 and 1998, and a panel data of TIAA-CREF accounts covering the 
period 1987-1999. They model two portfolio choices: (1) the decision to hold stock or 
not (using a Probit procedure) and (2) the choice of how much equity to hold, 
conditional on stock ownership (using simple Ordinary Least Squares). Ameriks & 
Zeldes (2004) consider three separate exclusion restrictions by estimating a model with 
age and time effects and a model with age and cohort effects. 
With respect to equity ownership probabilities, their regression results with no 
cohort effects reveal a significant hump shape in the age-ownership profile. The 
regression with no time effects shows a monotonic increase until around 50 years of 
age, and a levelling off thereafter. With respect to the amount of stock held conditional 
on stock ownership, Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) find that when cohort effects are 
excluded from the specification, the estimated age-ownership profile is extremely flat. 
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The regression with no time effects shows a steady increase in the age-ownership 
profile. However, Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) conclude that after taking into account 
several complexities, including key features of individual portfolio behaviour, a 
fundamental identification issue, and lack of perfect data, the evidence indicates that 
individuals do not gradually decrease equity shares as they age. 
2.2.2. Labour Supply Flexibility and Asset Allocation 
Using panel data from the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Benitez-
Silva (2002) conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between measures of 
labour supply flexibility and portfolio choice decisions by utility-maximising 
individuals. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, Benitez-Silva (2002) finds 
that individuals with more labour supply flexibility, on average, hold between 12% and 
14% more wealth in stocks in their portfolios. 
Similarly, Cocco, Gomes, & Maenhout (2005) provide evidence that the share 
invested in equities decreases with age. They note that this is driven by the fact that the 
labour income profile itself is downward sloping, that is labour supply flexibility 
decreases as one becomes older. 
2.2.3. Australian Evidence on Age-Specific Patterns in Asset Allocation 
In a study of Australian share ownership, the Australian Stock Exchange (2004) 
reports an increase in equity participation (direct and indirect share ownership) from 
40% to 55% over the period 1998-2004. This study also indicates that the percentage of 
individuals owning equity steadily increases with age. 
Using data from the 2002 HILDA6 survey, the Reserve Bank of Australia (2004) 
reports that the percentage of Australian households owning equity investments follows 
a hump-shaped pattem: equity participation increases from 29% for the 16-34 age range 
to 53% for the 55-64 age range, and then decreases to 34% for those aged 75 or over. In 
addition, the median value of equity holdings for Australian households follows a 
similar trend. Equity allocation increases from $7,000 for the 16-34 age range to 
$48,000 for the 65-74 age range, and then declines to $30,000 for those aged 75 or over. 
6 Household, Income, and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
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3. SURVEY OF LIFE-CYCLE FUNDS 
One of the mam reasons for the popularity of life-cycle funds is that they 
simplify asset allocation and fund selection for investors of different ages and risk-
preference groups, who are often unprepared and unwilling to make these decisions 
themselves (Morentsov, 2006). 
Behavioural finance studies [for example, Madrian & Shea (2001), Michell, 
Mottola, Utkus, & Yamaguchi (2006), Agnew, Balduzzi, & Sunden (2003), Iyengar, 
Jiang, & Huberman (2004), and Huberman & Jiang (2006)] indicate that some 
individuals suffer from psychological biases with respect to retirement savings 
decisions, such as inertia, procrastination, and choice overload. The existence of such 
behavioural biases hinders the ability to make rational decisions. Thus life-cycle funds 
offer an approach to retirement investing that does not require individuals to actively 
make decisions but to put in place a semi-active investment strategy with one decision. 
3.1. The U.S. Experience 
Financial practitioners are frequently advising their clients to reduce their 
exposure to risky assets as they become older: that is, to shift their investments away 
from stocks and towards bonds or other fixed interest securities. The following 
statement from a retirement strategies booklet from TIAA-CREF, a U.S. based 
retirement fund with assets over US$3 80 billion, is typical: 
If you retire early, you should receive a larger percentage of income from equity-
based accounts, since your income will need to grow with inflation, perhaps for 
30 years or more. As you age, you might consider switching to more predictable 
income sources, such as fixed-income and real estate account (TIAA-CREF, 
2005, p. 32). 
Similar views can be found in finance theory such as that by Malkiel (1996, pp. 
404-405) who claims that "the longer the time period over which you can hold your 
investments, the greater should be the share of common stocks in your portfolio." 
The operation of life-cycle funds reflects the above advice. Life-cycle funds are 
managed funds that automatically reduce the proportion of equities to total assets as an 
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investor ages. In choosing a life-cycle fund an investor selects a fund with a "target 
date" closest to his expected retirement. Existing life-cycle funds generally offer target 
dates ranging from 2010 to 2040, with five or ten-year increments. For example, the 
U.S. fund family, Vanguard, offers a series of life-cycle funds (Vanguard Target 
Retirement) with target dates 2010 to 2050, in five-year increments. A 55-year old in 
2006 who is planning to retire at age 64 (nine years to retirement) could choose the 
Vanguard Target Retirement 2015 fund. Upon the investor's retirement date, funds are 
generally rolled into the lowest-risk fund of a target-date series typically referred to as 
an "income" fund. Essentially, selecting an appropriate target date is the only decision 
that investors are faced with when investing in a life-cycle fund. 
First introduced to the U.S. investment environment during the mid-1990s, life-
cycle funds have experienced a significant amount of growth in recent years. At the end 
of 2005, the U.S. target-date fund population had a total $70 billion in assets under 
management, of which Fidelity Investments managed $50 billion. To put these figures 
into context, in 2005, mutual funds managed a total $3.4 trillion in retirement account 
assets. U.S. households owned a further $780 billion in mutual fund assets through 
variable products at life insurance companies held outside of retirement accounts 
(Investment Company Institute, 2006, p. 2). Figure 3.1 shows the growth of life-cycle 
funds in the U.S. From modest beginnings in the mid-nineties, the amount of money 
held in life-cycle funds gradually increased until 2001/2002, after which these funds 
experienced rapid growth. As at June 2006, fund tracker Morningstar held 155 target-
date funds in its database (Carlson, 2006). To address the phenomenon of target-date 
funds in the United States, Morningstar introduced three new mutual fund categories in 
March 2006: "target-date 2000-2014" "target-date 2015-2029" and "target-date 2030+." 
The five major providers of target-date funds in the U.S. are Fidelity Investments, 
Vanguard, T.Rowe Price, Principal Investors, and Barclays. 
17 
Figure 3.1 
Growth of Life-Cycle Funds 
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Figure 3.1 also provides a breakdown of life-cycle fund assets between 
Employer-Sponsored Defined Contribution (DC) Plans, Individual Retirement Accounts 
(IRA's), and "Other" Investors. The main distribution channels for life-cycle funds are 
through Employer-Sponsored Plans and IRA's. Combined, these two distribution 
channels accounted for almost 90 percent of life-cycle fund assets as at the end of 2005 
(Investment Company Institute, 2006, p. 10). Marquez (2005) reports that 38 percent of 
401(k) plans offer life-cycle funds and 37 percent of plan participants use these funds. A 
study completed by the Financial Research Corporation (2006) reports that the 
attractiveness of life-cycle funds among investors and retirement plan sponsors is 
expected to continue. It is anticipated that small DC plans will experience the largest 
sales growth, as plan providers increasingly focus on the small-plan DC market and as 
target-date funds prove to be the most cost-efficient asset allocation tool for this 
particular segment of the market. Also, IRA's are expected to experience gradually 
increasing sales as a growing number of job changers choose target-date funds for IRA 
rollovers. On the other hand, little growth in target-date funds is expected in retail 
accounts due to "inherent conflicts of interest in selling asset allocation products 
through commission or fee-based accounts" (Financial Research Corporation, 2006, p. 
14). 
18 
Based on the concept of life-cycle investing, target-date funds are marketed 
mainly for retirement purposes. In particular, these funds have been designed to target 
those investors who demand a simple investment vehicle that does not require asset 
allocation rebalancing and frequent monitoring on their part. Target-date funds are 
likely to be suitable for investors who want to adopt an age-based investment strategy, 
are unlikely to seek financial advice, do not have the time and/or knowledge to actively 
manage their retirement portfolio, or suffer from psychological barriers which hinder 
the ability to make rational decisions. 
3.2. Retirement Saving Behavioural Problems 
The existence of psychological barriers among individuals is well-documented 
in the behavioural finance literature. Empirical research suggests that when it comes to 
saving for retirement, some individuals suffer from certain behavioural biases such as 
procrastination, inertia, and choice overload. In an analysis of the 40l(k) savings 
behaviour of the participants of a large U.S. company plan, Madrian & Shea (2001) find 
that there is a significant increase in plan participation when automatic enrollment is in 
place, compared to the low participation rates when employees must make an active 
decision to participate. Specifically, they report an increase in participation rates from 
49 percent to 86 percent, suggesting procrastination of the decision to participate in the 
401(k) plan prior to automatic enrollment as a potential key explanation for the change 
in participation rates (Madrian & Shea, 2001 ). Madrian & Shea (200 1) also document 
"default" behaviour, whereby a large percentage of employees who became plan 
participants via automatic enrollment did not change their default contribution rates and 
default fund allocations over time. In other words, these employees suffered from inertia 
in relation to the investment reallocation decision. 
Using a dataset of more than 1500 retirement plans, Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, & 
Yamaguchi (2006) find that most participants display profound inertia. Over a two-year 
period, a majority of participants (80 percent) initiate no trades, and an additional 11 
percent makes only a single trade. Agnew, Balduzzi, & Sunden (2003) also provide 
evidence of inertia in asset allocations. They find that the participants of a large 
corporate 401(k) plan, who entered the plan before April1994 with a default allocation 
of 100 percent to the risk-free asset, have average equity allocations that are 
considerably lower than those of later entries, who were required to make an explicit 
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asset allocation choice (Agnew, Balduzzi, & Sunden, 2003). In other words, there is a 
tendency for participants to maintain their initial default allocations rather than revise 
their asset allocations. 
The Australian superannuation industry has followed a worldwide trend of 
investment choice expansion. In the current retirement savings environment, members 
are faced with a vast menu of investment choices. The Australian Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (2006, p. 31) reports that the average number of investment choices offered in 
corporate, industry, public sector, and retail funds in 2005 was 4, 9, 6, and 61 
respectively. For some individuals, the plethora of investment choice available can be 
overwhelming, and may result in "choice overload". 
A number of studies have investigated the effect of the number of investment 
choices (size of the investment menu) on individuals' savings behaviour. Using a 
sample of 647 401(k) plans, Iyengar, Jiang, & Huberman (2004) test the hypothesis that 
employee participation rates decline as the number of fund options increase. They find 
that the more funds a plan offers, the less likely an employee is to participate. Iyengar, 
Jiang, & Huberman (2004) show that participation rates peaked at 75 percent when only 
two funds were offered. Participation steadily decreased to a low of 60 percent when 59 
funds were offered. In a study of 638 401(k) plans, Huberman & Jiang (2006) find that 
participants generally use a small number of funds (no more than three or four) 
regardless of the number of funds offered. 
Overall, such findings suggest that the availability of too many investment options 
can lead to individuals experiencing feelings of information overload, resulting in 
increased use of the default option and declines in participation rates. The evidence is 
similar in Australia. A significant proportion of superannuation members are passive 
decision-makers, with 55.7% of superannuation assets being held in the default 
investment strategy for the year ending June 2005 (Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, 2006t 
Target-date funds offer a potential solution for those individuals who require 
additional assistance in managing their portfolios. The age-based automatic rebalancing 
feature can be useful in overcoming psychological biases or any such problems 
7 Based on the total assets of those superannuation entities with more than four members. 
20 
preventing individuals from taking a more active role in the management of their 
retirement savings. 
3.3. A Comparison of Target-Date Funds 
A survey of current target-date funds suggests that while they are based on the 
concept of age-phasing, they do vary considerably in relation to a number of key factors 
including asset allocation structure, expense ratios, and investment objectives and 
strategies employed. This is illustrated in Appendix A Table 1 which reports some key 
investment details for those mutual funds tracked by Morningstar (US) which are 
categorised as either "target-date 2000-20 14" "target-date 20 15-2029" or "target-date 
2030+." 
The following information is provided for each of the target-date funds in a 
provider's fund series: Total Assets (total assets under management), Net Asset Value 
(the fund's per-share price calculated as total assets of the fund less fees and expenses 
divided by number of shares outstanding), Expenses (expense ratio, front load fee, and 
deferred load fee), and Asset Allocation (cash, stocks, bonds, and "other"). 
The following observations have been made with respect to the information 
based on target-date funds tracked by Morningstar (US) only. It is important to note that 
some (if not all) target-date series offered by each ofthe fund families offer a number of 
share classes for each fund in their series, which will therefore have different costs 
attached.· 
3.3.1. Asset Allocation 
Overall, equity holdings range from nil to 98.8 percent. For example, none of 
SunAmerica's High Watermark target-date portfolios have an allocation to equity. They 
invest in cash and bonds only. On the other hand, Seligman's TargETFund portfolios 
maintain a large allocation to equity, with the decrease in equity over the life-cycle 
being replaced by allocation to bonds. Using the target-date of 2010 to compare the 
target-date fund series, the largest stock holding is 65.3 percent (AllianceBernstein) and 
the lowest stock holding is nil (SunAmerica). 
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The rate of decrease in equity allocation vanes between the target-date 
portfolios. For example, the largest change in equitl is a movement of 44.8 percentage 
points from 92.1 percent to 47.2 percent (Barclays' LifePath series). The smallest 
change in equity is a movement of 20.6 percentage points from 81 percent to 60.4 
percent (Schwab's Target series). 
In terms of cash holdings, there is a general tendency to increase allocation to 
cash as the retirement date draws closer. Using the target-date of 2010 to compare the 
target-date portfolios, the largest cash holding is 26.6 percent (SunAmerica's High 
Watermark C 2010) and the smallest cash holding is 0.5 percent (DWS-Scudder's 
Target 2010). 
For each of their target-date funds, DWS-Scudder and Wells Fargo allocate very 
little to cash (no more than two percent), with allocations being concentrated on equity 
and bonds. SunAmerica actually decreases its allocation to cash in favour of bonds as 
the retirement date draws closer. 
In terms of bond holdings, there is a general tendency to increase the allocation 
to bonds as the retirement date draws closer. Increases in bond allocation vary between 
the target-date fund series. For example, the largest change in bonds9 is a movement of 
44.3 percentage points from 10.2 percent to 54.5 percent (Wells Fargo's Advantage DJ 
Target). The smallest change in bonds is a movement of 15.6 percentage points, from 
11.9 percent to 27.5 percent (Schwab's Target). 
Overall, inspection of the asset allocation figures for the target-date funds in 
Appendix A Table 1 suggests that they become conservative very quickly. For example, 
DWS-Scudder's Target 2014 portfolio only allocates 26.4 percent to equity. An 
individual investing in this portfolio in 2006 would still have approximately seven years 
until retirement plus life expectancy period. 
3.3.2. Asset Holdings 
Target-date funds often employ a fund-of-funds approach. That is, the 
investments within the life-cycle funds are other funds offered by the sponsoring fund 
family. They invest in their own family mutual funds. For example, Fidelity's Freedom 
8 Measured as the percentage point difference in equity between those portfolios with a 2040 target-date 
and those portfolios with a 2010 target-date. 
9 Measured as the percentage point difference in bonds between those portfolios with a 2040 target-date 
and those portfolios with a 2010 target-date. 
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target-date funds are well-diversified among its own actively managed funds. The 
Fidelity Freedom 2040 holds five international funds, including Fidelity Japan, Fidelity 
Southeast Asia, and Fidelity Europe. Some of its other fund holdings include Fidelity 
Mid-Cap Stock, Fidelity Blue Chip Growth, and Fidelity Investment Grade Bond. 
On the other hand, Wells Fargo's Outlook target-date funds take a different 
approach, as they invest directly in shares and bonds rather than mutual funds. Top 
holdings in the Wells Fargo Outlook 2040 include Microsoft, Pfizer, Citigroup, and 
General Electric. 
3.3.3. U.S. Expense Ratios 
The fees attached to life-cycle funds generally tend to decrease as the retirement 
date draws closer. For example, Russell's LifePoints 2040 portfolio has an expense ratio 
of 1.51 percent, which gradually decreases to 1.35 percent for the LifePoints 2010 
portfolio. Of the 21 fund families who offer target-date funds as categorised by 
Morningstar, Vanguard offers the lowest-cost series ofthese funds and does not attach 
either a Front or Deferred load. 
The difference between the highest and lowest expense ratios within each of the 
fund families' target date series', range from nil to 0.84 percent. Different expense ratio 
patterns are evident among the funds. For example, Barclays, Principal Investors, and 
Wells Fargo maintain the same expense ratios for all funds in their target-date series; 
DWS-Scudder, JPMorgan, MassMutual, MFS, Russell, Schwab, Seligman, 
VantagePoint Funds, and T.Rowe Price progressively decrease their expense ratios as 
the target-date draws closer; Hartford Mutual Funds decrease their expense ratios 
equally from the latest to the earliest occurring target-date. StateFarm on the other hand 
actually slightly increase their expense ratios as the target-date draws closer. 
3.4. The Australian Experience 
Life-cycle funds are now beginning to emerge in Australia. In 2005, Russell 
Investment Group introduced Australia's first series oflife-cycle superannuation funds-
Russell LifePoints target portfolios. Russell (Australia) adopts a manager-of-managers 
approach, whereby each of its life-cycle portfolios invests in a mix of growth and 
income investments via the Russell Multi-Manager funds (Russell Investment Group, 
2005). According to Dunstan (2006), Russell's LifePoints portfolios are starting to 
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attract interest from superannuation funds in addition to members of Russell's master 
trust. 
Aside from Russell Investment Group, the only other known providers of life-
cycle funds at the time of writing are AMP and Virgin Money10• With AMP, 
superannuation contributions are invested in the portfolio structured for the relevant age 
group. However, investors have the option of switching one-up or one-down from the 
portfolio structure of their age group in order to take a more conservative or more 
aggressive approach. The core investment of the Life Stages series is the AMP Balanced 
Direct fund. AMP also adopts a multi-manager approach through investing in its Future 
Directions investment options. 
In contrast to the life-cycle portfolios offered by Russell and AMP, Virgin offers 
two different choices, balanced and aggressive. Each option contains four funds which, 
like AMP's LifeStages series, are based on investors' ages. Virgin invests in funds 
managed by Macquarie Funds Management. Both Virgin and AMP stress that their life-
cycle funds are intended to be a 'whole of working life' strategy. That is, they are not 
intended to be combined with any other investment option. Combining the use of a life-
cycle fund with other investment options negates the automatic age-based rebalancing 
feature of the funds. Life-cycle funds are based on the principle of age-based investing. 
In order for results to be realised, a full commitment of retirement savings is required. If 
investors are prepared to manage and rebalance their own portfolios, then life-cycle 
funds do not offer any advantages. 
There are two key ways in which life-cycle funds operate in terms of automatic 
rebalancing: progressive operation and step-like operation. With a progressive 
operation, the fund's asset allocation changes frequently. For example, a fund's 
investment mix may be moved towards a more conservative position on a continuous or 
annual basis. A step-like operation involves changes in the fund's asset allocation when 
an investor reaches a threshold age. This type of operation is employed by the Virgin 
Money LifeStage Tracker and AMP LifeStages series'. As an example, the asset 
allocation for an individual who invests in Virgin's "under 40's mix" fund will be 
automatically adjusted once the investor reaches the entry age for the next portfolio, the 
"over 40's mix". With Russell LifePoints, asset allocation is re-balanced automatically 
every year, progressively reducing the allocation to growth-type assets. 
10 The LifeStages and Life Stage Tracker series respectively. 
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3.5. Life-Cycle Funds as a Default Option 
The default investment options within U.S. 401(k) plans are typically money 
market funds. Approximately sixty-seven percent of plans have money market or stable 
value funds as their default option (Marquez, 2005). Research from the Vanguard 
Center for Retirement and Research notes that plan sponsors are increasingly focusing 
on the need to adopt more balanced default investment options in recognition of the 
long-term nature of retirement savings plans (Utkus, 2004). One potential solution to 
this more "balanced" approach is the adoption of life-cycle funds as a default option, 
offering a series of funds containing a mixture of asset classes (both equity and income 
securities) based on the investor's expected time to retirement, which is automatically 
rebalanced as the investor ages (Utkus, 2004). Life-cycle funds are offered by more than 
one third of 401(k) plans in the United States (Marquez, 2005), where they increasingly 
serve as a default option. 
How life-cycle products would serve as a default option to members within the 
Australian superannuation environment is unclear, in part because these products are 
very new to Australia. Life-cycle funds also challenge the status quo of existing 
superannuation fund default options. Unlike the typical money market funds employed 
as default options in a majority of 401(k) plans in the U.S., current default options 
offered within Australian superannuation funds are generally positioned more towards a 
balanced or diversified investment strategy. An analysis concerning investment 
strategies in Australian superannuation funds, conducted by Rice Walker Actuaries, 
provides some insight into this issue by warning that members should avoid using life-
cycle products that shift away from growth assets at too young an age, as "they are too 
conservative and they cost members money" (Rice Walker Actuaries, 2006, p. 8). They 
argue that adopting life-cycle funds as a default option exposes funds to the risk of 
members returning in the future and claiming that they lost their money due to the 
trustee strategy. 
The analysis states that the default options of Australian superannuation funds 
typically invest 70 to 80 percent in growth assets, "reflecting the view that super is a 
long term investment, and that growth assets offer the highest returns" (Rice Walker 
Actuaries, 2006, p. 4). Providing the average asset allocations for Australian default 
investment strategies (broken down into corporate, industry, public sector, and retail 
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superannuation funds), Table 3.1 confirms that Australian superannuation fund default 
options are generally geared more towards growth assets. The table indicates that there 
is a large degree of consistency among the key superannuation sectors in terms of 
average asset allocations in the default investment options. The last column reports that 
on average, the total proportion of superannuation assets allocated to "growth-type" 
assets (shares and property) was 64 percent in 2005, with the majority of default 
strategy assets being held in equities. 
Table 3.1 
Asset Allocation of Default Investment Strategy- Proportion of Assets (%) 
Entities with more than four Members 
Aust Shares 
Int'l Shares 
Property 
-Listed 
-Unlisted 
Aust Fix Interest 
Int'l Fix Interest 
Cash 
Other 
Corporate Industry 
36 35 
25 23 
4 
3 
14 
5 
4 
9 
3 
7 
10 
5 
5 
13 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: APRA (2006, Table 16) 
Public Sector 
32 
29 
4 
5 
11 
7 
8 
4 
100% 
Retail 
30 
17 
4 
2 
19 
4 
8 
15 
100% 
Total 
33 
23 
4 
4 
13 
5 
7 
10 
100% 
To compare the asset allocation between the Australian life-cycle products and 
the default investment options of Australian superannuation funds, Tables 3.2 to 3.4 
provide the asset allocation weights for the Australian superannuation funds data that 
have been employed in this thesis (HESTA, STA, GESB, and UniSuper), the existing 
Australian life-cycle funds, and a fund series that is representative ofthe U.S. life-cycle 
funds population. 
The funds examined in this thesis are four of Australia's larger not-for-profit 
superannuation funds. HESTA, STA, and UniSuper are industry funds, whereas GESB 
is a public-sector fund. Further information regarding these funds is provided in Chapter 
4. 
Looking first at the default option asset allocations of the four superannuation 
funds, the allocation to risky assets generally falls within the 60 percent to 75 percent 
range. Although all four life-cycle funds begin with significantly higher allocations to 
growth assets (85 percent to 100 percent), it is clear that the funds shift away from 
growth assets early in the life-cycle. For those individuals who are approximately 13 
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years (3 years) from their expected retirement date, the corresponding fund invests as 
little as 46 percent (20 percent) in growth assets. 
Table 3.2 
Industry Superannuation Fund Default Asset Allocation by Asset Class 
This table shows the asset class exposures for each fund's default investment option for 
the 2005/2006 financial year. 
Date Cash Fixed Property Int Aust 
Int11 Shares Shares 
HESTA "Core Pool" 
1/7/2005 4.0 12.0 12.0 23.0 30.0 
STA "Balanced Plan" 
1/7/2005 5.8 9.5 8.7 26.7 36.9 
GESB "Conservative Plan" 
1/7/2005 2.0 68.0 5.0 15.0 10.0 
UniSuper "Balanced" 
1/7/2005 0.0 30.0 10.0 25.0 27.5 
Infras'ture 
9.0 
7.3 
Priv Abs Other 
Equity Rtn 
Str 
4.0 3.0 3.0 
3.0 2.3 
7.5 
Source: HESTA, STA, GESB, and UniSuper 2005/2006 annual reports 
Table 3.3 
Australian Life-CJ!.cle Fund Asset Allocation bJ!. Asset Class 
Cash Aust Int'l Alt's12 Aust Int'l Prop 
Bonds Bonds Shares Shares 
Russell Investment Graue. "LifePoints" 
2040 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 40.0 10.0 
2030 1.0 11.0 5.0 3.0 37.0 35.0 8.0 
2020 8.5 18.5 11.5 1.5 26.0 25.0 9.0 
2010 22.5 23.5 14.0 0.0 17.5 15.0 7.5 
AMP "LifeStaz.es" 
2040 1.1 4.7 1.9 2.0 44.6 43.1 2.8 
2030 3.3 18.8 9.7 6.5 28.7 24.0 9.1 
2020 12.5 24.0 17.0 5.0 19.0 15.5 7.0 
2010 32.0 21.7 16.1 4.0 11.7 8.9 5.6 
Virz.in Money "Life Stage Tracker" (Balanced choice) 
2040 15.0 47.0 32.0 6.0 
2030 30.0 38.0 24.0 8.0 
2020 50.0 25.0 15.0 10.0 
2010 80.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 
Fidelity Investments "Freedom JJ 
2040 2.6 12.3 84.2 
2030 2.8 14.3 82.1 
2020 4.0 25.4 69.8 
2010 11.1 38.8 49.0 
11 For the GESB "Conservative Plan", the Fixed Interest asset class includes inflation-linked bonds and 
global bonds. 
12 The "Alternatives" asset class refers to an income-type asset class for Russell LifePoints, where as it 
refers to a growth-type asset class for AMP Life Stages. 
27 
Source: Russell Investment Group PDS (Issued: 30 September 2005), AMP PDS 
(Issued: 3 September 2005), Virgin Money PDS (Issued: 7 November 2005), and 
Fidelity Freedom prospectus (Issued: 30 May 2006) 
Table 3.4 
US. Representative Life-Cycle Fund Asset Allocation by Class 
The Fidelity Freedom target-date funds are used as a representative for the U.S. target-
date fund population as they have the largest amount of total net assets. 
Cash Bonds Shares Other 
Fidelity Investments "Freedom " 
2040 2.6 12.3 84.2 0.9 
2030 2.8 14.3 82.1 0.8 
2020 4.0 25.4 69.8 0.7 
2010 11.1 38.8 49.0 1.1 
3.6. Limitations of the Life-Cycle Investment Strategy 
As suggested by Rice Walker Actuaries (2006), a risk of an under-allocation to 
equity during the life-cycle is underperformance of the retirement investment and 
ultimately, an insufficient superannuation balance upon retirement. Additionally, with 
current mortality statistics suggesting an extended life expectancy13, members are faced 
with increased longevity risk. That is, the risk of living longer than expected and 
outliving savings. Thus, the need to maintain a long-term focus and hold a sufficient 
level of growth assets in the retirement portfolio at all times is of increasing importance. 
On the other hand, an over-allocation to growth assets at certain points in an 
individual's life-cycle can also pose risks. For example, holding a large proportion of 
growth assets in the period leading up to retirement exposes retirement savings to short-
term market fluctuations, potentially resulting in losses and a lower retirement benefit. 
Whether or not life-cycle funds are an appropriate retirement investment vehicle 
essentially depends on the individual investor. Life-cycle funds offer simplification of 
the investment process. Individuals can be passive-active. That is they elect to not do 
anything but allow a manager to adjust their portfolio automatically. In the current 
superannuation environment which is characterised by choice, life-cycle funds may be 
an attractive option for members who feel overwhelmed by the plethora of investment 
choice available. Similarly, such funds may be appropriate for members who do not 
want to actively manage their own retirement portfolio due to psychological biases like 
13 According to ABS Life Tables, the average worker retiring in 2003 (at age 65) can expect to 17 years if 
male, and 21 years iffemale (Rice Walker Actuaries, 2006). 
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procrastination and inertia, or a lack of time and/or knowledge. However, whilst life-
cycle funds offer an age-based, "set and forget" type investment strategy over the static 
investment strategy employed by default options, such products are not without their 
shortcomings. Some key potential disadvantages associated with the use of life-cycle 
funds are identified next. 
First, life-cycle funds assume limited differences among investors, leading to 
oversimplification of investment decisions. For example, individuals of the same age 
may differ in terms of expected retirement date, risk tolerance, needs at retirement, 
existing portfolio allocation, and wealth. Each life-cycle fund is typically geared to 
investors solely on age. That is, those in their 20's/30's are placed in the most 
aggressive fund, and those who are older are invested in one of the more conservative 
funds. While age may be one of the factors that determines an investor's appetite for 
equity, it may not be the most important one. 
Second, life-cycle funds shift away from growth assets early in the life-cycle. As 
previously pointed out, an under-allocation to growth assets can lead to 
underperformance of the retirement investment resulting in an inadequate retirement 
benefit. 
Third, life-cycle funds are designed to be a "one-stop-shop." That is, investors 
should commit 100 percent of their retirement savings and future contributions to the 
one fund. Investing in several life-cycle funds or combining a life-cycle fund with other 
investments defeats the purpose of the "whole of working life" strategy espoused by 
life-cycle funds, and works against the automatic rebalancing feature of the funds 
(Marquez, 2005). Combining the use of a life-cycle fund with other funds is also more 
costly. 
Fourth, as life-cycle funds are a very new product, they have not established 
much of a track record, posing performance measurement difficulties. Further, the 
significant differences between available life-cycle funds, in terms of asset allocation 
structure, expense structure, investment strategies and objectives, raises questions as to 
the best way to perform peer group performance comparisons when the funds are so 
different. 
Fifth, life-cycle funds generally carry higher fees and expenses than typical 
"balanced" or "diversified" funds. 
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3.7. Summary 
Life-cycle funds challenge the status quo of existing "balanced" funds typically 
offered as default investment options within Australian superannuation funds. The 
advantages of implementing life-cycle products as a default option within 
superannuation funds may not be as extensive in the Australian context compared to the 
United States. There a majority of retirement plans currently employ money market 
funds as default options, which is inconsistent with the long-term nature of retirement 
savings. The adoption of life-cycle products as a default option could also potentially 
threaten the role of financial advisers in deciding asset mixes (Dunstan, 2006), leading 
to a possibly reduced financial adviser role within the superannuation industry though 
investors likely to choose such products may have been less likely to use advisers in the 
first place. Life-cycle funds can be helpful for investors who want to adopt an age-based 
investment strategy, are unlikely to seek financial advice, do not have the time and/or 
knowledge to actively manage their retirement portfolio, or suffer from psychological 
barriers such as procrastination, inertia, and choice overload. Through their automatic 
rebalancing feature, such funds offer simplification of the retirement investment 
process. 
Life-cycle funds are not without their limitations. Some of the limitations of life-
cycle funds include, the assumption of limited differences among investors, a shift away 
from growth assets early in the life-cycle, combining a life-cycle fund with other 
investments works against the automatic rebalancing feature of the funds and is also 
more costly, and life-cycle funds have not established a track record which poses 
performance measurement difficulties. 
30 
4. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter first provides a description of the data used in this thesis and a brief 
comparison of the two key superannuation fund data sets in terms of summary statistics. 
Also in this chapter is an explanation of the research methods employed, including a 
preliminary analysis which involved sorting member asset allocations by age, gender, 
and marital status, and comparing actual member allocations with existing life-cycle 
fund asset allocations, and a regression framework involving the Probit and Tobit 
methods. 
4.1. Data Description and Definition of Variables 
The primary data employed in this thesis has been provided by four Australian 
superannuation funds: the Health Employees Superannuation Trust (HESTA), the 
Superannuation Trust of Australia (STA), the Government Employees Superannuation 
Board (GESB), and UniSuper. Combined, these four superannuation funds had $57 
billion in assets under management and over 2.3 million members as at 30 June 200614. 
The fund data employed in this study is divided into two key data sets: 
1. Full sample: collective information containing membership data obtained from 
the funds for all member investment strategy changes since the respective fund 
first introduced investment choice (93042 observations); and 
2. Restricted sample: combined data containing the base membership data and 
additional survey information for those members who have exercised choice 
since the respective fund fi~st introduced investment choice and responded to a 
survey which examined the intentions of the members to change their 
investment strategy and make extra contributions (2315 observations )15 • 
Appendix B Table 1 contains definitions of the variables used in the regression 
analysis. Details of this analysis are explained in the following subsection. Summary 
14 HESTA, STA, UniSuper, and GESB 2005/2006 Annual Report. 
15 This data was collected by a PhD student working on a sponsored project associated with this thesis. 
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statistics16 for the main variables used in this study are reported below in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2. 
Table 4.1 
Summary Statistics of Fund Member Characteristics: Full Sample 
This table presents summary statistics relating to the superannuation characteristics of 
HESTA, STA, and GESB members in the full sample, including equity participation, 
age, gender, member contributions, fund, and year of choice. 
Variable Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
Equity Participation: 
Yes 81826 
No 11213 
Unknown 3 
Total 93042 
Eguity Allocation (%) 93039 55.27 28.42 0.00 100.00 
Age at Choice 86154 38.72 11.73 11.00 77.00 
Gender: 
Male 38297 
Female 47848 
Not Specified 6897 
Total 93042 
Total contributions in 2004 ($) 65826 3,694.61 5,549.13 0.12 219,165.00 
Fund: 
HESTA (1) 47843 
STA (2) 25698 
GESB (3) 19501 
Total 93042 
Calendar Year of Choice: 
1995 42 
1996 129 
1997 928 
1998 1185 
1999 2111 
2000 4899 
2001 19238 
2002 15980 
2003 25540 
2004 22987 
Unknown 3 
Total 93042 
16 Observations with missing values are not included in calculations of summary statistics. 
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Table 4.2 
Summary Statistics of Fund Member Characteristics: Restricted Sample 
This table presents summary statistics relating to the superannuation characteristics of 
HESTA, STA, GESB, and UniSuper members in the restricted sample including equity 
participation, age, gender, member contributions, fund, year of choice, and net wealth. 
Variable Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
Equity Participation: 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Equity Allocation (%) 
Age 
Gender: 
Male 
Female 
Not Specified 
Total 
Marital Status: 
Married/I)e-facto 
Separated/I)ivorce/Widow 
Single 
Unknown 
Total 
Total contributions in 2004 ($) 
Fund: 
HESTA (1) 
STA (2) 
GESB (3) 
UniSuper (4) 
Total 
Calendar year of choice: 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Total 
Net Wealth: 
$0-$100000 
$100001-$200000 
$200001-$300000 
$300001-500000 
$500001-$700000 
Above$700000 
Unknown 
Total 
2009 
306 
2315 
2315 
2315 
1001 
1306 
8 
2315 
1732 
255 
288 
40 
2315 
2163 
755 
178 
561 
821 
2315 
3 
3 
21 
57 
139 
147 
540 
313 
610 
482 
2315 
238 
227 
291 
479 
368 
591 
121 
2315 
57.23 30.56 0.00 100.00 
44.96 10.70 15.43 104.82 
7,425.76 9,462.04 0.00 114,274.50 
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In both data sets, the majority of members have equity in their investment 
strategy. The average member asset allocations to equity are comparable between both 
data sets, with 55.27 percent for the full sample and 57.23 percent for the restricted 
sample. The average member age is slightly higher for the restricted sample ( 45 
compared to 39). Also, the majority of individuals are female (51 percent for the full 
sample and 56 percent for the restricted sample). The average member contribution in 
2004 was higher for the restricted sample ($7,426 compared to $3,694), and most asset 
allocation changes took place between 2001 and 2004. 
Data regarding U.S. and Australian life-cycle funds and information on asset 
allocations and cost structures in particular have been sourced from the Morningstar 
(U.S.) website and product disclosure statements, and have been discussed in Chapter 
Three. Strategic asset allocations for the "default" investment options offered by 
HESTA, STA, GESB, and UniSuper have been obtained from their 2005/2006 annual 
reports. General Australian superannuation default strategy statistics including 
percentage of total superannuation assets held in the default investment strategy and 
average asset allocation of the default strategy were obtained from the Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) published data. 
4.2. Description of Funds and Investment Strategy Choices 
As at June 2006, HESTA had 550,000 members (primarily from the health and 
community services industry) and 45,000 employers were registered with the fund 
(HESTA, 2006). HESTA first offered choice to its members in 1995. STA initially 
offered choice to its members in July 1997. On 1 July 2006, STA merged with the 
Australian Retirement Fund (ARF) and Finsuper to form AustralianSuper. 
AustralianSuper represents more than 1.2 million members and over $20 billion in 
funds under management. As at June 2006, GESB had over 270,000 members 
(primarily from the health and community services industry), 45,000 participating 
employers, and GESB managed $6.85 billion in funds for its members (GESB, 2006). 
GESB first offered choice to its members in April 2001. UniSuper had 364,948 
members as at 30 June 2006 and total assets under management of $19.3 billion 
(UniSuper, 2006). UniSuper first offered choice to its members in 1998. 
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HESTA, STA, and GESB offer members the choice ofreadymade options (a set 
of specified investment strategies set by the fund) or a do-it-yourself strategy, whereby 
members actively choose their own investment strategy. Members may also blend the 
readymade options and the do-it-yourself strategy. UniSuper offers members a set of 
readymade investment options. The investment offerings of the four funds are 
summarised in Appendix B Table 2. 
4.3. Research Methods 
4.3.1. Preliminary Analysis 
Before employing a regression framework to examine equity participation and 
equity allocation within member superannuation accounts, a summary of actual age-
based member asset allocations is presented. This involves arranging members who 
made investment choice changes to their asset allocation into age quintiles. For each of 
the major asset classes, average allocations are then calculated. Member asset 
allocations are also sorted by gender (broken further into age quintiles) and marital 
status. This analysis complements the regression analysis. 
4.3.2. Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis was used to individually investigate the two key portfolio 
decisions: equity participation and equity allocation. To examine the effect of age on the 
likelihood of stock ownership, a Probit regression was employed. As equity 
participation is a discrete variable (that is, member chooses equity or member does not 
choose equity), it is inappropriate to use the simple Ordinary Least Squares method. 
Also, the use of a more sophisticated binary response model like Probit allows certain 
limitations of the linear probability model to be overcome (Wooldridge, 2006) 
including: (1) fitted probabilities can be negative or greater than one; and (2) the partial 
effect of any independent variable (appearing in level form) is constant. The Probit 
model is estimated using Maximum Likelihood estimation, whereby the most likely 
values of regression parameters are estimated given the specific data set. 
Equation 1 describes the relationship between the likelihood of equity 
participation and age: 
(1) 
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where 
<I> is the standard cumulative normal distribution; 
SHARE_ ALLOCi,r denotes whether a member has an equity allocation (1) or not (0); 
AGEi, is the age of the member (in years) when decision made; 
x;8 is a vector of explanatory variables which are described further in Appendix B 
Table 1; and 
u i 1 is a normally distributed error term. 
Two versions of the above model are estimated in the next chapter. In the first 
version, equity participation was regressed on age, gender, and member contributions 
only. This is the basic member information made available by the funds and available to 
the funds. In the second version, equity participation was regressed on a number of 
additional variables including marital status, risk profile, education, whether a member 
invests in shares or managed investment funds external to their superannuation account, 
and net wealth (excluding superannuation) to explore conditioning of age effects on the 
likelihood of equity participation. This data was sourced through a survey conducted on 
participants in 2005 as part of a larger study into the four funds. 
To investigate the independent effect of age on the level of equity allocation, and 
the significance of age relative to other member characteristics in explaining equity 
allocation, a Tobit regression (censored regression) was used. Using Ordinary Least 
Squares is inappropriate in this case as it ignores the fact that some of the observations 
in the sample are censored, that is members can allocate between zero and 100 percent 
only with no short-selling permitted in any asset class. Ordinary Least Squares would 
lead to biased estimates of equity allocation. The Tobit model, which is estimated using 
the Maximum Likelihood technique, is well-suited to the dependent variable employed 
in this study as equity allocation is equal to zero (non-stock ownership) for a significant 
fraction of the sample, and the positive values for equity allocation are approximately 
continuously distributed (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 595). Only those members who hold 
equity in their superannuation portfolios were included, since equity participation and 
equity allocation conditional on ownership were being analysed independently. 
Equation 2 describes the relationship between equity allocation and age. 
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SHARESi,r = {3 0 + f31AGEi,r + x;o + ui,r, if 0 < SHARESi,t < 1; 
(2) 
where 
SHARESi,t denotes a member's percentage allocation to equity in their superannuation 
account conditional on them having equity and is bounded at 1 00%; 
AGEi 1 is the age ofthe member (in years) when decision made; 
x;o is a vector of explanatory variables which are described further in Appendix B 
Table 1; and 
ui 1 is a normally distributed error term. 
Similar to the estimations of the Probit model in Equation 1 specified 
previously, estimation of the Tobit model involved regressing equity allocation on: (1) 
age, gender, and member contributions only; and (2) additional explanatory variables, 
including marital status, risk profile, education, whether a member invests in shares or 
managed investment funds, and net wealth in order to test the relative importance of age 
in determining equity allocation conditioned on these variables. 
Each of the regressions explained above were performed for each individual 
superannuation Fund 17• All regressions are controlled for time effects or "trends" in 
equity ownership and allocation as described by Ameriks & Zeldes (2004), by including 
year dummy variables. That is, the regressions control for any potential effects related 
to the date of observation (the year a particular investment choice is made). 
Further, rather than include age as a continuous variable in the regressions, 
which assumes a linear relationship between age and equity participation/equity 
allocation, members were classified into age quintiles to capture possible non-linear age 
effects. Analytical procedures were performed using Eviews (version 5). 
17 HESTA, STA, and GESB (for the full sample) and HESTA, STA, GESB, and UniSuper (for the 
restricted sample). 
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5. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter summarises superannuation member asset allocations sorted by age, 
gender (broken further into age quintiles) and marital status, and presents a comparison 
of actual age-based member allocations with that suggested by available life-cycle 
products. It also presents and discusses the results of an empirical investigation of a 
sample of members' investment strategy decisions and key demographics, notably age. 
A set of Probit and Tobit regressions was performed on the full sample and restricted 
sample of superannuation fund data. The full sample contains 93042 observations 
including membership data collected by the four superannuation funds (HESTA, STA, 
GESB, and UniSuper), for all member investment strategy changes since investment 
choice was introduced by the respective funds. The restricted sample contains 2315 
observations including the combined membership and additional survey information for 
members who have exercised choice since the respective fund first introduced 
investment choice, and responded to a survey which examined the intentions of the 
members to change their investment strategy and make extra contributions. All 
regressiOns were performed for each individual fund resulting in a total of 14 
regressiOns. 
5.1. Preliminary Results 
5.1.1. Equity Allocations 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarise member asset allocations, showing the average 
percentage of the superannuation portfolio held in cash, fixed interest, property, shares, 
and an asset class termed 'other'. The observations in the two key datasets are sorted by 
age, gender (further sorted by age), and marital status18 . Appendix C Tables 1 and 2 
report the average relative asset allocations for fund members. This analysis excludes 
observations where members adopt only one readymade option19 as opposed to a do-it-
yourself strategy, or a mixture of both the readymade option and the do-it-yourself 
strategy. The analysis is therefore based on members who can be regarded as actively 
18 Information regarding members' marital status is available for the restricted data set only. 
19 A specified investment strategy which is set by the fund. 
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choosing an asset class allocation level by choosing a given percentage or have chosen 
an allocation by blending readymade options. 
Overall, the results suggest that age has a discernible effect on the asset 
allocation. There are some marked patterns in superannuation member asset allocation 
which both support and run counter to the age-phasing advice frequently offered. In 
Table 5.1, the overall average allocation to shares is 55.41 percent. When sorted by age 
group, a hump-shaped pattern is evident in the allocation to shares; on average, 
members under 36 allocate 56.99 percent of their superannuation account to shares, 
members in the 36-42 age groups allocate 57.25 percent to shares, and members in the 
43-48 age group allocate 60.01 percent to shares. For the 49-54 age group the average 
allocation decreases to 52.99 percent, and falls further to 41.93 percent for those 
members over 55. The average allocations to "safer" assets (cash and fixed interest) 
exhibit an inverse pattern to this, decreasing during a key portion of an individual's 
working life, and increasing significantly in the immediate period before retirement. 
This hump-shaped pattern in equity allocation is generally consistent with existing 
empirical findings [for example, Yoo (1994), Poterba & Samwick (1997), Agnew, 
Balduzzi, & Sunden (2003), and Ameriks & Zeldes (2004)]. 
Using pooled cross-sectional data from five waves of the Survey of Consumer 
Finances between 1983 and 1998, and TIAA-CREF panel data covering the 1987 to 
1999 period, Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) examine the relationship between equity 
allocation and age. To address the inherent identification problem that time, age, and 
cohort effects do not change independently, Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) estimate a model 
with age and time effects only, and a model with age and cohort effects only. Based on 
a regression specification with age and time effects (excluding cohort effects), they find 
that the share of equity in financial assets has a hump-shape pattern with age. 
In a study of7,000 retirement accounts in a large 401(k) plan, Agnew, Balduzzi, 
& Sunden (2003) reveal a hump-shaped age-equity allocation profile when observations 
are sorted by age, with mean equity allocations being 37.50 percent, 42.50 percent, and 
44.01 for the 35, 35 to 44, and 45 to 54 age groups. For the 55 to 64 age group the mean 
allocation decreases to 37.65 percent, and falls further to 4.75 percent for those 
participants over 65. Although their initial regression results suggest that age has a 
negative effect on the equity allocation (more specifically, each additional year 
translates into a lower allocation to stocks by 93 basis points), a specification including 
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both age and age squared to capture possible non-linearity in the relationship between 
equity allocation and age reveals that equity allocation peaks very early, at 32.5 years of 
age. 
The results for the smaller dataset of members replying to the survey presented 
in Table 5 .2, suggest a negative linear age-equity ownership profile; the average equity 
allocations are 63.53 percent, 60.87 percent, 58.85 percent, 55.35 percent, and 46.26 
percent for the under 36, 36-42, 43-48, 49-54, and over 55 age groups respectively. 
When those observations containing only one readymade option are excluded 
from the two datasets, the asset allocation percentages remain quite similar to those in 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 however there are some notable differences. As seen in 
Appendix C Table 1, although the average allocation to equity does primarily increase 
with age and then decrease (from the 43-48 age group), the initial increase is relatively 
flatter than previously; there is not a great deal of change in equity allocation within the 
first few age groups. In Appendix C Table 2, the average percentage of the 
superannuation portfolio held in equity falls with age with the exception of the 43-48 
age group, in which the equity percentage rises just over one percentage point. An 
additional observation is that when sorted by age only, the decrease in equity allocation 
from the 49-54 age group to the over 55 age group, is considerable. This is maintained 
across all four breakdowns discussed above. 
When observations are sorted by gender the results show that on average, male 
members allocate a larger percentage of their superannuation accounts to equity than 
their female counterparts. In the full sample presented in Table 5.1, males allocate 55.71 
percent to equity compared to 50.28 percent for females. In the restricted sample 
presented in Table 5.2, males allocate 59.21 percent to equity compared to 55.26 
percent for females. Appendix C Table 1 and Table 2 show that the exclusion of those 
observations with only one readyrnade option does not affect this observation. This is in 
line with the view of previous studies that men are more overconfident relative to 
women or report more confidence in areas such as finance (Barber & Odean, 2001). 
Prince (cited in Barber & Odean, 2001, p. 265) asserts that men tend to feel more 
competent than women do in financial matters. As a result, it is expected that men trade 
more and hold more risky portfolios than women. Barber & Odean, (2001) estimate the 
portfolio risk characteristics in terms of gender. The results from their time-series 
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regression analysis reveals that women are inclined to hold less risky portfolio positions 
than their male counterparts. 
When the observations for both datasets are sorted by both gender and age, the 
age-equity ownership patterns evident are similar to those exhibited when the 
observations are sorted by age only. In the full sample presented in Table 5.1, equity 
allocation increases with age and then decreases. For males, the average equity 
allocations are 57.29 percent and 58.45 percent for the under 36 and 36-42 age groups. 
The average allocation then decreases to 56.36 percent for the 43-48 age group, and 
further decreases to 51.28 percent and 39.76 percent for the 49-54 and over 55 age 
groups respectively. For females, those members under the age of 36 allocate 56.76 
percent of their superannuation portfolio to shares. This increases and peaks at 59.71 
percent for the 36-42 age group. The average allocation then decreases to 58.65 percent 
for the 43-48 age group, and further decreases to 54.29 percent and 44.26 percent for the 
49-54 and over 55 age groups. One key difference between the mean allocations sorted 
by age and the mean allocations sorted by gender and age, is that those allocations 
sorted by gender and age that exhibit a hump-shaped pattern appear to peak earlier in 
the life-cycle (36-42 age group) rather than later ( 43-48 age group). 
A general negative linear age-equity ownership profile is evident in Table 5.2 as 
average equity allocations decrease as a function of age, with the exception of the 49-54 
age group for males, where the average allocation actually increases by just over two 
percentage points. For males, the average equity allocations are 66.19 percent, 61.13 
percent, 60.45 percent, 62.63 percent, and 44.51 percent for the under 36, 36-42, 43-48, 
49-54, and over 55 age groups respectively. For females, average allocations are 61.66 
percent, 60.66 percent, 57.46 percent, 50.50 percent, and 47.48 percent for the under 36, 
36-42, 43-48, 49-54, and over 55 age groups respectively. When those observations 
containing only one readymade option are excluded from the two datasets, the asset 
allocation percentages are relatively similar to those in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. For the 
full sample presented in Table 5.1, a hump-shaped pattern prevails peaking at the 36-42 
age group for both males and females. For the restricted sample presented in Table 5.2, 
the average allocation to shares decreases monotonically for females, but is less stable 
for males. 
Another important observation is related to the marital status of individuals. 
Married members tend to hold a higher allocation to equity in their superannuation 
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accounts. In the full sample presented in Table 5.2, the average equity allocation for 
married members is equal to 58.32 percent, while unmarried members allocate an 
average of 54.33 percent. In Appendix C Table 2, the average allocation for married 
members is equal to 43.91 percent, while the average for unmarried members is 39.97 
percent. This is consistent with the finding of Agnew, Balduzzi, & Sunden (2003), who 
report that the average allocation to equity for married participants is 42.88 percent 
compared to 36.52 for single participants. They (Agnew, Balduzzi, & Sunden, 2003) 
offer two potential explanations for this pattern: (1) idiosyncratic labour-income shocks, 
and (2) a stronger bequest motive. First, Agnew, Balduzzi, & Sunden (2003) explain 
that couples with dual income earners experience diversification of idiosyncratic labour-
income shocks which exposes their non-financial income to less risk (Agnew, Balduzzi, 
& Sunden, 2003, p. 198). As a result, these individuals are encouraged to undertake 
more aggressive asset allocations than single investors. Second, they state that the 
bequest motive is stronger for married couples. The bequest motive extends an 
investor's horizon beyond his life span, and models of optimal portfolio choice predict 
higher allocation to equities the longer the time horizon (Agnew, Balduzzi, & Sunden, 
2003, pp. 198-199). Following this argument, married couples have a longer time 
horizon than single participants, as a result of their stronger bequest motive and 
therefore have a higher allocation to equities. 
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Table 5.1 
Average Asset Allocations by Group- Full Sample 
This table presents statistics for average member asset allocations, showing the average 
percentage of the superannuation held in cash, fixed interest, property, shares, and 
'other'. Observations are sorted by age only, and gender and a~e. 
Obs Cash F.Interest Pro~erty Shares Other 
ALL 93042 9.74 17.09 12.49 55.41 5.28 
AGE: 
<36 35745 9.49 16.00 12.12 56.99 5.40 
36-42 18189 8.15 17.22 12.27 57.25 5.11 
43-48 12362 6.60 14.82 13.89 60.01 4.68 
49-54 11029 9.69 19.48 12.81 52.99 5.02 
55+ 8829 16.94 25.55 11.04 41.93 4.54 
Unknown 6888 11.70 11.71 13.82 55.23 7.54 
GENDER: 
Male 38297 9.22 17.97 11.64 55.71 5.47 
<36 15646 8.58 17.01 11.60 57.29 5.51 
36-42 6380 7.52 17.19 12.02 58.45 4.82 
43-48 6916 7.48 19.00 12.55 56.36 4.61 
49-54 4788 10.09 22.22 11.90 51.28 4.51 
55+ 4564 17.24 28.91 9.96 39.76 4.13 
Unknown 3 4.38 3.47 11.82 71.12 9.22 
Female 47848 13.55 18.52 12.83 50.28 4.82 
<36 20090 10.20 15.22 12.52 56.76 5.31 
36-42 7874 7.55 14.42 13.24 59.71 5.09 
43-48 9378 7.54 15.12 13.55 58.65 5.12 
49-54 6240 9.38 17.39 13.51 54.29 5.42 
55+ 4265 16.61 21.95 12.19 44.26 4.98 
Unknown 1 30.00 27.00 12.00 28.00 3.00 
Gender unknown 6897 11.68 11.71 13.83 55.24 7.55 
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Table 5.2 
Average Asset Allocations by Group Restricted Dataset 
This table presents statistics for average member asset allocations, showing the average 
percentage of the superannuation held in cash, fixed interest, property, shares, and 
'other'. Observations are sorted by age only, gender and age, and marital status. 
Obs Cash F.Interest Pro,eert~ Shares Other 
ALL 2315 10.35 17.35 10.36 57.23 6.21 
AGE: 
<36 476 5.51 16.34 9.93 63.53 6.99 
36-42 414 8.57 15.47 11.18 60.87 5.51 
43-48 558 9.54 16.89 10.31 58.85 5.97 
49-54 452 10.65 18.20 10.82 55.35 6.33 
55+ 415 18.45 20.05 9.62 46.26 6.25 
GENDER: 
Male 1001 10.08 16.48 9.41 59.21 6.01 
<36 196 4.47 14.27 9.56 66.19 7.11 
36-42 183 8.94 14.64 10.15 61.13 6.44 
43-48 260 9.83 15.88 9.96 60.45 5.18 
49-54 181 5.92 17.94 8.59 62.63 6.06 
55+ 181 21.84 20.14 8.53 44.51 5.52 
Female 1306 10.60 18.08 11.02 55.76 6.29 
<36 280 6.23 17.79 10.18 61.66 6.88 
36-42 231 8.27 16.13 12.00 60.66 4.59 
43-48 298 9.29 17.77 10.62 57.46 6.67 
49-54 271 13.81 18.38 12.31 50.50 6.52 
55+ 226 16.28 20.47 10.04 47.48 6.41 
Gender unknown 8 3.00 6.25 22.38 51.25 17.13 
MARITAL 
STATUS: 
Married/De-facto 1732 10.58 16.76 9.86 58.32 5.81 
Unmarried 543 9.22 18.62 12.12 54.33 7.57 
Unknown 40 15.56 25.43 8.48 49.62 4.09 
The actual member asset allocations described above are not completely consistent with 
the operation of life-cycle funds. Whereas life-cycle funds follow a general decreasing 
trend (either through a progressive or step-like operation), the above trends suggest that 
members of the superannuation funds either follow a decreasing pattern or hump-shaped 
pattern in their asset allocations over the life-cycle. 
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5.2. Regression Results 
5.2.1. Effect of Age on Equity Participation and Equity Allocation 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 summarise the estimation results20 from the "restricted" 
regressions, whereby equity participation and equity allocation are regressed on age, 
gender, member contributions, and a set ofyear dummies only. 
The results confirm that there is a significant relationship between member age 
and (1) equity participation, and (2) equity allocation. As seen in Table 5.3, the 
estimated coefficients on all age group variables are statistically significant for STA, 
GESB, and two of the four categories for HESTA at the 99% level, and at 95% for one 
of the four categories for REST A. The results suggest that only for HESTA members is 
the relationship between age and equity participation non-linear or supportive of a 
hump-shaped pattern. Relative to the base age group (under 36), those members in the 
36 to 42 age group are more likely to hold shares in their superannuation account. From 
this point, members are increasingly less likely to hold shares than members under 36. 
For STA and GESB, the probability of equity participation decreases monotonically as 
members become older. 
The results for STA suggest that male members are more likely to hold shares 
than female members and the amount of members' total contributions to their 
superannuation account has a positive effect on the likelihood of equity participation 
(that is, the higher the contribution amount the more likely a member is to hold equity), 
however this estimated effect is modest. All time dummies are statistically significant at 
the 99% level. 
The Tobit regression results (in the form of estimated coefficients) in Table 5.4 
also exhibit a hump-shaped pattern across all funds; members initially increase their 
equity allocations up to a certain age, after which point the amount held in equity 
decreases. Relative to the base age group, those members in the 36 to 42 age group hold 
more shares in their superannuation account. The results for HESTA suggest that 
members in the 43 to 48 age group also hold more shares than the base group (but less 
than the 36 to 42 age group). From this point, members hold increasingly less shares 
than members under 36. 
20 The heteroskedasticity- robust standard errors reported in parentheses have been estimated using the 
quasi-maximum likelihood (Huber/White) method. Note that in the case of binary dependent variable 
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Other general findings include: male members hold more equity in their super 
accounts than their female counterparts; the higher the contribution amount, the larger 
the portion of the superannuation account that is held in equity (again, this effect is 
modest); and, all time dummies are statistically significant21 at the 99% level. 
It should be noted however, that although the estimated Probit and Tobit 
regression results allow for determining the statistical significance of the variables of 
interest, and whether a particular variable has a positive or negative effect on the 
dependent variable, they do not provide the magnitude of the effect an explanatory 
variable has on the dependent variable. The estimated coefficients from a limited 
dependent variable model cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect on the dependent 
variable. In the case of binary response models, unlike the linear probability model 
which assumes constant marginal effects, the Probit model implies diminishing 
magnitudes of the partial effects (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 592). 
models, these standard errors are not robust to heteroskedasticity; they are robust to certain 
misspecifications of the underlying distribution of y (QMS, 2004). 
21 With the exception of the 2003 time dummy variable for STA. 
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Table 5.3 
Regression Results for Pro bit Estimation of Equity Participation: Full Sample 
P(SH _ALLOCi,t = 1)= <I>(/3 0 + /31AGEi,t + x;o + ui,t) 
This table presents the estimation results from the "restricted" Probit regressions, 
whereby equity participation was regressed on age, gender, member contributions, and a 
set of year dummies only. The following are coefficient estimates, not marginal effects. 
Dependent Variable: Equity Participation (SH ALLOC) 
Estimate 
Variable HESTA STA GESB 
Constant 1.615933 0.860023 1.427831 
(0.025661) (0.035686) (0.062956) 
Age Categories: 
36-42 0.032026 -0.188799*** -0.276802*** 
(0.028431) (0.037657) (0.061543) 
43-48 -0.052326** -0.367312*** -0.321091 *** 
(0.025781) (0.035813) (0.058015) 
49-54 -0.151289*** -0.604358*** -0.680473*** 
(0.029232) (0.038224) (0.060921) 
55+ -0.302194*** -0.983167*** -1.135710*** 
(0.0311202 (0.0380952 (0.065020) 
Member 
Characteristics: 
Male -0.033416 0.036005 -0.031697 
(0.021694) (0.029923) (0.041442) 
Er cants 1.09E-05*** 1.40E-06 1.87E-05** 
~2.42E-062 ~1.55E-06) (8.85E-06) 
Calendar Years: 
1997 1.695431 *** 
(0.280952) 
1998 0.934702*** 
(0.122807) 
1999 1.899083*** 
(0.134524) 
2000 1.809132*** 
(0.099094) 
2001 0.392054 *** 0.783246*** 0.873412*** 
(0.058650) (0.055548) (0.053773) 
2003 -0.598120*** -0.136007*** -0.249957*** 
(0.024430) (0.029622) (0.058080) 
2004 -0.237352*** 0.682776*** 0.564739*** 
(0.028367) (0.037414) (0.079646) 
Observations 35318 17609 12831 
Obsw/Dep= 0 3720 3241 781 
Obsw/Dep= 1 31598 14368 12050 
Pseudo R 2 0.047335 0.177322 0.186300 
LR Stat (9 df) 1125.566 2981.857 (13 df) 1096.482 
Note: robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using the quasi-maximum 
likelihood (Huber/White) method. In the case of binary dependent variable models, 
these standard errors are not robust to heteroskedasticity; they are robust to certain 
misspecifications of the underlying distribution of y (QMS, 2004). 
***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 5.4 
Regression Results for Tobit Estimation of Equity Allocation: Full Sample 
SHARESi,t = {3 0 + {31AGEi,t + x;o + ui,t, if 0 < SHARESi,t < 1 
This table presents the estimation results from the "restricted" Tobit regressions, 
whereby equity allocation was regressed on age, gender, member contributions, and a 
set of year dummies only. The following are coefficient estimates, not marginal effects. 
Dependent Variable: Equity Allocation (SHARES) 
Estimate 
Variable HESTA STA GESB 
Constant 64.65755 56.92620 61.16975 
(0.344541) (0.535129) (0.574870) 
Age Categories: 
36-42 1.896169*** 0.822122* 0.586314* 
(0.380522) (0.436620) (0.326814) 
43-48 1.331016*** -0.221786 -1. 711664*** 
(0.362292) (0.451044) (0.335684) 
49-54 -0.482485 -3.171667*** -3.397259*** 
(0.415857) (0.580716) (0.501597) 
55+ -4.149244*** -8.592687*** -7.382350*** 
(0.500664) ~0.7250982 (0.810674) 
Member 
Characteristics: 
Male 2.763531 *** 0.798730** 2.342647*** 
(0.308650) (0.398863) (0.293967) 
Er cants 1.26E-06 0.000158*** 1.55E-05 
(2.44E-052 (2.43E-05) (5.80E-05) 
Calendar Years: 
1997 10.71085*** 
(0.854515) 
1998 -4.963126*** 9.680279*** 
(0.498334) (0.817416) 
1999 -2.397903*** -7.654025*** 
(0.484552) (0.682267) 
2000 6.863969*** 4.661718*** 
(0.405979) (0.512912) 
2001 7.706509*** 7.880753*** 5.251008*** 
(0.460982) (0.595672) (0.544927) 
2003 -6.798784*** -0.157651 -3.927489*** 
(0.378365) (0.558409) (0.786086) 
2004 -1.826013*** 7.371387*** 2.361901 *** 
(0.412079) (0.559904) (0.764905) 
Observations 30960 14368 12050 
Pseudo R 2 0.047362 0.066733 0.065397 
Log Likelihood -140682.4 -62785.20 -49380.87 
Note: robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using the quasi-maximum 
likelihood (Huber/White) method. 
***,**,*denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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To summarise the effect of the explanatory variables on the probability of equity 
participation (SH_ALLOC) and the amount of equity held (SHARES), the standard 
method of computing the marginal effects at the mean of the explanatory variables (that 
is, replacing each explanatory variable with its sample mean) is employed (Dougherty, 
2002, p. 291) and requires the calculation of scale factors22 . Tables 5.5 and 5.6 report 
the estimated 200423 marginal effects for the age variables. 
Table 5.5 
Estimated Probit Age Marginal Effects (2004) 
This table presents the estimated 2004 age marginal effects from the "restricted" Probit 
regressions, whereby equity participation was regressed on age, gender, member 
contributions, and a set of year dummies only. 
HESTA STA GESB 
36-42 
43-48 
49-54 
55+ 
Table 5.6 
0.004724 
-0.008663 
-0.028420 
-0.067545 
Estimated Tobit Age Marginal Effects (2004) 
-0.028392 -0.023746 
-0.069760 -0.029740 
-0.148968 -0.109198 
-0.327121 -0.303731 
This table presents the estimated 2004 age marginal effects from the "restricted" Tobit 
regressions, whereby equity allocation was regressed on age, gender, member 
contributions, and a set of year dummies only. 
36-42 
43-48 
49-54 
55+ 
HESTA STA GESB 
0.009319 
0.007039 
-0.003215 
-0.043270 
0.000752 
-0.000245 
-0.005879 
-0.038745 
0.000007 
-0.000041 
-0.000136 
-0.000919 
With respect to the likelihood of equity participation, the marginal effects for 
HESTA members reveal a marginal hump shape in the age-participation profile, with an 
initial increase early in the life-cycle, and decreasing from the 43 to 48 age group. 
Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) also find a hump-shaped age-ownership profile when they 
22 As all explanatory variables (except ER _ CONTS) included in the regression models are binary 
variables, the marginal effects are calculated as follows: the binary explanatory variables are set to one 
~ 
and the sole continuous variable is set to its average in order to generate a value for the index, x' f3 . The 
standard normal cumulative distribution function is applied to this value to compute a scale factor, then 
multiplied by the respective AGE coefficient. Age marginal effects are calculated for each age dummy 
variable, for each calendar year included in a particular regression. As the education and wealth 
explanatory variables are categorical, it does not make sense to set all variables to one when calculating 
the marginal effects. The following variables are set to one to calculate the index value; 
POST GRAD DEG and HIGH WEALTH. 
23 The-age ma~ginal effects reported in the above tables are those for the year 2004, to allow for a 
meaningful comparison between the funds. 
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estimate a model with age and time effects, excluding cohort effects from the 
specification24. For STA and GESB members, the marginal effects exhibit a general 
negative relationship between age and the probability of equity participation. For all 
funds, the probability of owning equity in the superannuation account decreases 
considerably between the 49 to 54 and over 55 age groups. 
In relation to the amount of equity held (conditional on equity participation), the 
marginal effects suggest that for members of HESTA and STA, the amount of equity 
held in their superannuation accounts follows a very slight hump-shaped pattern25 . 
However this pattern is less evident for GESB members, with the estimated age-equity 
allocation profile being extremely flat. 
In terms of time effects, the estimated age marginal effects across the different 
years do not reveal any consistent trends in equity participation and equity allocations 
related to the date of observation. However, there is some marked variation in equity 
participation and equity allocations for some years which are not reported in the tables 
but are discussed below. 
Firstly considering the funds on an individual basis the age-participation profile 
for HESTA members was relatively flat during 2001, but much more pronounced in 
2003 and 2004 exhibiting a hump-shaped profile. The marginal effects for the first three 
age groups are similar with the only noteworthy difference being that during 2004, there 
was an increased probability for members to hold equity in their superannuation 
accounts. In terms of equity allocations, the 2000 and 2001 age-equity allocation 
profiles are flat. The remaining years are all quite similar to each other, with the notable 
difference being that for the first two age groups, members held increasingly slightly 
more equity in their accounts in 1998 and 2003 compared to 1999 and 2004. This 
pattern is reversed for the two oldest age groups in 1998 and 2003, whereby members 
allocated increasingly less equity than in 1999 and 2004. 
A potential reason for these "trends" in equity participation is that high stock 
returns during these periods may have generated increased public attention, resulting in 
some members learning about and participating in the stock market Ameriks & Zeldes 
24 However, their regression results indicate a significant hump-shaped pattern. The regression 
specifications estimated by Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) differ to those estimated in this thesis, as they 
estimate fixed-effects models. 
25 The amount of equity held peaks between the age of 43 to 48 for HESTA members, and 36 to 42 for 
STA members. 
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(2004). The increase in the size of investment menus in recent years may also be a 
possible reason for such "trends". 
For STA members, the 1997, 1999, and 2000 age-ownership profiles are all flat, 
whereas the remaining years exhibit an overall negative age effect on the likelihood of 
holding equity. This effect is most evident in the 2003 marginal effects, where the 
progressive reduction in the likelihood of equity participation is higher across all age 
groups compared to the other years. In relation to equity allocation, for all years (except 
1999) the age-ownership profiles are flat for the first three age groups. The 1999 profile 
stands out as the decrease in the amount held in shares is larger for the two oldest age 
groups than in any other year. Perhaps this suggests that the circumstances of the 
members in the older age groups change significantly at these age groups and as a result 
there is a need to revise the superannuation portfolio to one that is more appropriate for 
their position in the life-cycle. 
Overall for GESB members the marginal effects for all years are similar, with 
the exception of the 49 to 54 and over 55 age groups, where the decrease in the 
likelihood of equity participation is 9 percent (13 percent) smaller than 2001 (2003) for 
the 49 to 54 age group, and 13 percent (15 percent) smaller than 2001 (2003) for the 
over 55 age group. In terms of equity allocations, the 2001 and 2004 age-equity 
allocation profiles are flat. The major difference is visible from the 2003 marginal 
effects where the decrease in equity for the over 55 age group is significantly larger than 
in 2001 and 2004. 
Comparing the 2001, 2003 and 200426 marginal effects across the three funds, it 
IS evident that in terms of equity participation the age-ownership profile is flat for 
HESTA, and exhibits a decreasing trend for STA and GESB across all three years. In 
terms of equity allocation the age marginal effects for GESB produce an extremely flat 
age-equity allocation profile, whereas those for HESTA and STA present a general 
negative trend which is more visible for STA during 2001 and 2002. 
Overall, the marginal effects suggest that age is an important variable in 
determining equity participation and equity allocation; this is similar to the existing 
literature though the results are mixed. Two conflicting patterns are found with respect 
to the age-equity participation and age-equity allocation profiles, hump-shaped and 
26 These are the three years common to all three funds. 
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decreasing. The hump-shaped pattern is consistent with the findings of Ameriks & 
Zeldes (2004) and Y oo ( 1994 ), whilst the decreasing pattern is consistent with the 
findings ofBodie & Crane (1997) and Schooley & Worden (1999). 
5.2.2. Effect of Age Relative to other Variables on Equity Participation and 
Equity Allocation 
Appendix C Tables 5.7 and 5.8 summarise the results from estimating the 
regressions whereby equity participation and equity allocation are regressed on age, 
gender, member contributions, time dummies, and a set of additional explanatory 
variables as described in Section 4. 
Overall, when additional variables are introduced, the age-equity 
participation/allocation profiles exhibited are extremely varied across the four 
superannuation funds. In the case of equity participation, HESTA members aged 36 to 
42 are less likely to hold shares than members under 36; members in the 43 to 48 and 49 
to 54 groups are increasingly more likely to hold shares than the base age group, whilst 
members over the age of 55 are less likely to hold shares than the base age group. For 
the STA and GESB funds, members between 36 and 42 are more likely to hold shares 
than the under 36 group; members in the 43 to 48, 49 to 54, and 55 plus age groups are 
increasingly less likely to hold shares than the base age group. For UniSuper, members 
of all age groups are less likely to hold shares than the base age group, with the 
coefficients exhibiting no apparent trend. 
Other general findings include: male members are more likely to hold equity in 
their superannuation accounts than their female counterparts; the higher the contribution 
amount, the larger the portion of the superannuation account that is held in equity, 
however this effect is exceedingly small; those individuals who are married or in a de-
facto relationship are more likely to hold shares than unmarried members27; individuals 
who are willing to take substantial risk in expectation of earning substantial returns are 
more likely to hold shares than those individuals who are prepared to assume low to 
average financial risks; investing in shares or managed fund accounts outside of their 
superannuation account increases the probability of a member owning equity; and, 
individuals who have an average or high level of net wealth are less likely to hold shares 
than individuals with lower net wealth. 
27 This is the case for the REST A and GESB funds only. 
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The effects of the education variables on equity participation are less clear, with 
the regressions producing mixed results across the four funds. For HESTA, members 
who have completed a certificate, trade or diploma level of education, a bachelor 
degree, or a post graduate degree are more likely to hold shares relative to individuals 
who have completed some level of secondary education. For STA, members who have 
completed a higher level of education are less likely to hold shares in their 
superannuation account than members limited to some level of secondary education. For 
GESB, members who have completed a certificate, trade or diploma level of education 
or a post graduate degree, are less likely to hold shares than the base group; members 
with a bachelor degree are more likely to hold shares than the base group. For 
UniSuper, members who have completed a certificate, trade or diploma level of 
education are less likely to hold shares than the base group; members with a bachelor 
degree or post graduate degree are more likely to hold shares than the base group. 
As displayed by the Probit results, the estimated Tobit coefficients on the age 
variables also suggest mixed patterns in equity allocation. For HESTA, members in the 
first three age groups hold more of their super account in shares than members under 36, 
with the amount allocated to shares decreasing as members age. For UniSuper, members 
of all age groups hold less equity in their super accounts than members under 36. A 
decreasing trend is evident up until the 49 to 54 age range, after which point the amount 
allocated to equity actually increases. There is no clear trend evident for STA and 
GESB. 
Other general findings include: male members hold more equity in their super 
accounts than their female counterparts; the higher the contribution amount, the smaller 
the portion of the superannuation account that is held in equity (although this effect is 
modest); married members hold more shares than unmarried members; individuals who 
are willing to take substantial risk hold more shares than those individuals who are 
prepared to assume low to average financial risks; individuals who have completed a 
higher level of education hold a larger portion of their superannuation accounts in 
equity; members who invest in shares or managed fund accounts outside of their super 
accounts hold more shares; and average to high net-worth individuals hold more shares 
in their super accounts. 
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Table 5.7 
Regression Results for Pro bit Estimation of Equity Participation: Restricted Sample 
P(SH _ALLOCi,t =l)=ct>(fio + fi,AGE;, 1 +x;o +u;,1 ) 
This table presents the results from estimating the Probit regressions, whereby equity 
participation was regressed on age, gender, member contributions, marital status, risk 
profile, education, whether a member invests in shares or managed investment funds 
external to their superannuation account, net wealth (excluding superannuation), and a 
set of year dummies. The following are coefficient estimates, not marginal effects. 
De,eendent Variable: Eguitl: Partici,eation (SH ALLOC) 
Estimate 
Variable HESTA STA GESB UniSu,eer 
Constant 1.043422 1.097737 1.155851 0.287083 
(0.316705) (0.716706) (0.420719) (0.325699) 
Age Categories: 
36-42 -0.098723 0.975765* 0.083097 -0.081512 
\ (0.251382) (0.528095) (0.351762) (0.218209) 
43-48 0.105601 -0.308671 -0.085926 -0.035294 
(0.270428). (0.393744) (0.330771) (0.229523) 
49-54 0.133688 -0.360600 -0.362308 -0.430496* 
(0.252897) (0.598528) (0.381396) (0.233492) 
55+ -0.232546 -1.274025** -0.550659 -0.336276 
(0.262625) (0.526203) (0.4590472 (0.236523) 
Member 
Characteristics: 
Male 0.025793 0.300144 0.068587 0.239354* 
(0.158501) (0.272893) (0.269501) (0.129651) 
Er cants 5.86E-06 5.94E-05** 6.84E-05 6.34E-06 
(7.96E-06) (2.61E-05) (6.00E-05) (5.72E-06) 
Married/Defacto 0.329486* -0.025712 0.119201 -0.221350 
(0.168660) (0.328198) (0.228780) (0.174020) 
High Risk 0.363422** 0.996958** 0.818604*** 0.318120** 
(0.152860) (0.388720) (0.292190) (0.130183) 
Cert/Trade/Dip 0.087502 -0.244605 -0.318299 -0.105883 
(0.204440) (0.514765) (0.326411) (0.265790) 
Bachelor Deg 0.196306 -1.480967** 0.242741 0.148271 
(0.227277) (0.619509) (0.380039) (0.256544) 
Post Grad Deg 0.047769 -0.313423 -0.197643 0.022828 
(0.239870) (0.662422) (0.355565) (0.239354) 
Shares/MIF 0.151936 0.322818 0.727179*** 0.240282* 
(0.153941) (0.290089) (0.269087) (0.135229) 
Avg Wealth -0.118298 -0.685833* -0.626624** -0.014606 
(0.181502) (0.394670) (0.308552) (0.174915) 
High Wealth -0.054248 -0.073895 -0.770781 ** -0.282091 
(0.198692) (0.458153) (0.378963) (0.1977812 
Calendar Years: 
1997 
1998 0.683397* 
(0.363815) 
1999 0.965457*** 
(0.216587) 
2000 1.694088*** 
(0.439681) 
2001 0.572937 0.309637*** 0.974118*** 
(0.437353) (2.626398) (0.267770) 
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2003 -1.024579*** -0.743937** -0.990281 *** 0.519798*** 
(0.188328) (0.325857) (0.317939) (0.151786) 
2004 -0.044242 1.082482** 1.422983*** 
(0.208866) (0.463334) (0.240112) 
Observations 598 154 456 673 
Obsw/Dep= 0 75 21 27 119 
Obsw/Dep= 1 523 133 429 554 
Pseudo R 2 0.158758 0.372111 0.359655 0.158251 
LR Stat (17 df) 71.69320 45.65007 (16 73.73222 (16 99.37536 (20 
df) df) df) 
Note: robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using the quasi-maximum 
likelihood (Huber/White) method. In the case of binary dependent variable models, 
these standard errors are not robust to heteroskedasticity; they are robust to certain 
misspecifications of the underlying distribution of y (QMS, 2004). 
* * *, * *, * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 5.8 
Regression Results for Tobit Estimation of Equity Allocation: Restricted Sample 
SHARESu = /3 0 + f31AGEu + x;o + u; 1 , if 0 <SHARES; 1 < 1 
' ' ' ' 
This table presents the results from estimating the Tobit regressions, whereby equity 
allocation was regressed on age, gender, member contributions, marital status, risk 
profile, education, whether a member invests in shares or managed investment funds 
external to their superannuation account, net wealth (excluding superannuation), and a 
set of year dummies. The following are coefficient estimates, not marginal effects. 
De,eendent Variable: Eguity Allocation (SHARES) 
Estimate 
Variable HESTA STA GESB UniSu,eer 
Constant 54.50655 47.43495 57.95451 51.74440 
(4.521426) (6.661787) (5.180169) (4.953385) 
Age Categories: 
36-42 1.860445 -0.371872 0.050850 -2.895242 
(3.664709) (3.897533) (1.750327) (3.273255) 
43-48 0.443235 2.992684 -2.599022 -7.117905** 
(3.335332) (4.403460) (1.773382) (3.275731) 
49-54 0.026307 -3.142878 -1.690093 -10.14016*** 
(3.238227) (5.556036) (2.225338) (3.491886) 
55+ -4.446415 -2.336623 -6.099996* -6.226883 
(3.666758) (4.992463) (3.446762) (3.801800) 
Member 
Characteristics: 
Male -0.592003 -0.673406 3.618318*** 4.780589** 
(2.194862) (2.978350) (1.334755) (2.168621) 
Er cants 1.96E-05 -0.000241 * -0.000542 -3.50E-05 
(0.000108) (0.000140) (0.000370) (8.72E-05) 
Married/Defacto 2.555992 3.931112 -1.888969 2.703624 
(2.277771) (4.745221) (1.677344) (2.754752) 
High Risk 2.710976 19.94000*** 2.509112** 9.998554*** 
(2.173330) (3.060298) (1.260120) (2.327598) 
Cert/Trade/Dip 5.259207* 0.908023 2.912247 2.719121 
(2.800515) (3.563060) (2.011205) (4.258665) 
Bachelor Deg 5.774478* 3.811540 0.827926 4.553709 
(3.092143) (4.041567) (1.832049) (3.848205) 
Post Grad Deg 8.224229** 1.806737 -0.721052 2.536051 
(3.350874) (4.655946) (2.218134) (3.620095) 
Shares/MIF 2.483863 3.863539 2.136913* 0.385847 
(1.964550) (2.580811) (1.284442) (2.212474) 
Avg Wealth 2.037760 -2.031410 2.972276* -0.950896 
(2.466793) (3.243280) (1.542904) (2.818605) 
High Wealth 2.757656 2.954130 4.727437** 1.653663 
(2.633597) (3.605282) ~2.2062421 (3.313820) 
Calendar Years: 
1997 -0.769267 
(7.277825) 
1998 -6.512154* -9.625099 24.79187*** 
(3.467844) (8.955236) (5.808822) 
1999 -3.474323 -6.898588 23.38157*** 
(4.892123) (6.473921) (3.516936) 
2000 5.942643* 0.666110 13.63047*** 
(3.509581) (5.820776) (4.171905) 
2001 5.205543 1.192199 6.855095 23.76737*** 
(3.870962) (6.309185) (4.221869) (3.562738) 
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2003 -15.00762*** -9.304140 2.205452 7.000829** 
(3.738709) (6.711229) (4.901957) (3.103769) 
2004 -0.449095 6.392597 1.406957 18.19898*** 
(3.2755332 (5.737482) (4.817612) (3.459001) 
Observations 523 133 429 554 
Pseudo R 2 0.137085 0.377726 0.102955 0.199131 
Log Likelihood -2340.919 -546.6047 -1704.106 -2530.974 
Note: robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using the quasi-maximum 
likelihood (Huber/White) method. 
***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Once again, in isolation the age-equity ownership/allocation patterns exhibited 
by the regression results can be somewhat misleading. To consider the magnitudes of 
the age effects requires calculating the marginal effects. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 report the 
estimated 2004 marginal effects for the age variables. 
Table 5.9 
Estimated Probit Age Marginal Effects (2004) 
This table presents the estimated 2004 age marginal effects from the Probit regressions, 
whereby equity participation was regressed on age, gender, member contributions, 
marital status, risk profile, education, whether a member invests in shares or managed 
investment funds external to their superannuation account, net wealth (excluding 
superannuation), and a set ofyear dummies. 
36-42 
43-48 
49-54 
55+ 
Table 5.10 
HESTA STA 
-0.007730 
0.005600 
0.006698 
-0.022975 
0.000004 
-0.000264 
-0.000369 
-0.020163 
Estimated Tobit Age Marginal Effects (2004) 
GESB UniSuper 
-0.004326 
-0.001705 
-0.043329 
-0.028818 
This table presents the estimated 2004 age marginal effects from the Tobit regressions, 
whereby equity allocation was regressed on age, gender, member contributions, marital 
status, risk profile, education, whether a member invests in shares or managed 
investment funds external to their superannuation account, net wealth (excluding 
superannuation), and a set of year dummies. 
36-42 
43-48 
49-54 
55+ 
HESTA STA 
0.001686 0.000000 
0.000506 0.000000 
0.000032 0.000000 
-0.010854 0.000000 
GESB 
0.000000 
-0.000003 
-0.000001 
-0.000027 
UniSuper 
-0.000831 
-0.004000 
-0.009035 
-0.003044 
In relation to the Probit and Tobit marginal effects, similar patterns exhibited by 
the corresponding age coefficients prevail for the funds. It is important to note though, 
that the marginal effects show that the magnitudes of the effect of the age variables on 
the likelihood of equity participation and equity allocation are much smaller than the 
reported coefficients. 
There is a great deal of consistency in the Probit and Tobit marginal effects 
across all years, with no significant time effects present. Across all age groups and 
funds, a majority of the marginal effects are less than two percent with all of the STA 
and GESB Tobit marginal effects being equal to zero. 
58 
One salient feature of the above tables is that all marginal effects are 
significantly smaller than the corresponding marginal effects from the restricted 
regressions. This is especially evident from the Tobit marginal effects which take on 
either zero or trivial values when additional member characteristics are taken into 
consideration. Clearly, inclusion of the additional variables to the regression 
specifications results in the age factor becoming less significant in determining: (1) the 
likelihood of equity participation in superannuation accounts, and (2) the amount of 
equity held in superannuation accounts. This is also supported by the fact that across all 
funds, there is a large increase in the pseudo-R 2 values for the Probit and Tobit 
regressions that include the additional member characteristics. For example, the model 
including the additional variables for HESTA shows a pseudo-R 2 of 15.88 percent 
compared to 4. 73 percent for the restricted model. 
The preliminary and regression results discussed above provide mixed evidence 
as to the relationship between age and equity participation/equity allocation. Most 
importantly though, the regression results and estimated marginal effects generally 
suggest that age plays a significant role in determining (1) the probability of a member 
holding equity in their superannuation account, and (2) the amount of equity held in the 
superannuation account. One of the key patterns exhibited by the results in this study, a 
hump shape, agree with those of a number of previous studies including Schooley & 
Worden (1999), Yoo (1994), Poterba & Samwick (1997), Agnew, Balduzzi, & Sunden 
(2003), and Ameriks & Zeldes (2004). However, similar to the finding of Bodie & 
Crane (1997), some of the results suggest that there is a negative linear relationship 
between age and equity participation/equity allocation. 
Some of the relationships between equity participation/equity allocation and the 
member characteristics are generally consistent with previous findings, whilst others do 
not and are unclear. For example, the estimated coefficients for the regressions suggest 
that the following groups of individuals are more likely to hold equity, and conditional 
on equity participation, own more equity: (1) males, (2) individuals with higher 
contribution amounts, and (3) individuals who are married or in a de-facto relationship. 
Ameriks & Zeldes (2004) report similar findings, noting that male 401(k) participants 
invest 19.3 percent more in equities than their female counterparts and married 
participants invest 14.4 percent more in equities than their single counterparts. 
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In the two regresswns including the HIGH_RISK variable, the estimated 
coefficients suggest that individuals who are willing to take substantial risk are more 
likely to hold shares (and hold more shares, conditional on equity participation) than 
those individuals who are only prepared to assume low to average financial risks. This 
is consistent with the general risk-return theory that investors are willing to bear higher 
risk for a higher potential return. 
The unclear results relate to the estimated coefficients on the education and 
wealth variables. First, the regression results produce mixed results for the education 
variables across the four funds. For STA, members who have completed a higher level 
of education are less likely to hold shares in their superannuation account than members 
limited to some level of secondary education. For GESB, members who have completed 
a certificate, trade or diploma level of education or a post graduate degree, are less 
likely to hold shares than the base group, while members with a bachelor degree are 
more likely to hold shares than the base group. The results from the HESTA fund 
reflects more closely the relationship that would generally be expected between 
education level and equity participation, where individuals with a higher level of 
education are more likely to hold shares in their superannuation account. 
The estimated coefficients on the wealth variables propose that individuals who 
have an average or high level of net wealth are less likely to hold shares than individuals 
with lower net wealth. One would expect the opposite relationship to prevail, as 
members who are better-off financially will have a higher level of awareness of and 
play a more active role in their financial affairs. 
The findings ofthis thesis have several key implications. First, the results of the 
preliminary and regression analyses suggest two key patterns with respect to age and 
equity participation/allocation, hump-shaped and linear negative. Results also suggest 
that while age is an important factor in determining equity participation and equity 
allocation, when additional factors are taken into account, the importance of the age 
variable diminishes significantly. Thus, there is a need for superannuation funds to 
consider the effect of member characteristics in addition to the age variable in the 
design and structure of funds. 
Also, it is important for members to understand the consequences of an under-
allocation to growth assets in their superannuation accounts. A risk of an under-
allocation to equity during the life-cycle is underperformance of the retirement 
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investment and ultimately, an insufficient superannuation balance upon retirement. 
Equally important is the need to understand the consequences of an over-allocation to 
growth assets. Holding a large proportion of growth assets in the period leading up to 
retirement exposes retirement savings to short-term market fluctuations, potentially 
resulting in losses and a lower retirement benefit. The key goal at this stage of the life-
cycle is capital preservation. 
Third, fund trustees need to approach the issue of offering life-cycle products as 
a superannuation default option with care. They must assess whether or not life-cycle 
funds should be implemented in the best interests of members. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
There is much debate surrounding the age-phasing strategy, whereby investors 
reduce their exposure to growth assets in favour of "safe" assets as they become older. 
On one hand, financial practitioners frequently advise their clients to shift their 
investments away from stocks (towards bonds or other fixed interest securities) as they 
age. Alternatively, investment theory has argued that individuals should invest a 
constant proportion of their portfolios in equities regardless of age. The existing 
theoretical and empirical literature provides conflicting views regarding age-phasing. 
Life-cycle funds (also known as target-date funds) have been created in response 
to the perceived desire of investors to reduce their equity exposure within their 
investment portfolio as they age, and to address psychological biases such as inertia in 
retirement asset allocation portfolio decisions (Poterba, Rauh, Venti, & Wise, 2005). 
Such funds were first introduced to the U.S. investment environment during the mid-
nineties and have experienced a significant amount of growth in recent years. At the end 
of 2005, the U.S. target-date fund population had a total $70 billion in assets under 
management. Life-cycle funds are now beginning to emerge in Australia as a 
superannuation investment strategy. 
This thesis examined several questions. First, it provided an overview of the life-
cycle fund markets in the United States and Australia. Second, it summarised the 
theoretical and empirical literature relating to life-cycle asset allocation. Third, using a 
sample of member choices from four large Australian superannuation funds, this thesis 
investigated the difference between actual asset allocations and the asset allocations 
suggested by life-cycle products. This thesis employed a regression framework to 
examine the effect of age on (1) the likelihood of stock ownership and (2) the allocation 
of stock within superannuation accounts (conditional on stock ownership). Further, 
using additional demographic data, this thesis investigated the relative importance of 
age in explaining equity ownership and equity allocation in member investment choices. 
Four key findings emerged from this thesis. Existing life-cycle funds being 
offered in the United States and Australia vary considerably in terms of asset allocation 
structure, expense structure, and investment strategy. A comparison of the asset 
allocations between the Australian life-cycle products and the Australian 
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superannuation fund default investment options revealed that life-cycle products 
decrease individuals' exposure to growth assets very early in the life-cycle. Third, the 
age variable has a significant relationship with equity participation and equity 
allocation. The two key trends exhibited are hump-shaped and negative linear age-
ownership and age-allocation profiles. Finally, when additional member demographic 
variables like gender, marital status, risk profile, education, and wealth are taken into 
account there is a decline in the relative importance of age in explaining equity 
ownership and equity allocation 
A number of implications result from this thesis. First, the preliminary and 
regression results suggest two key patterns with respect to age and equity 
participation/allocation - hump-shaped and decreasing. The importance of the age 
variable diminishes significantly when additional factors are taken into account. Thus, 
superannuation funds need to consider the effect of member characteristics in addition 
to age in the design and structure of funds. Second, members need to be aware of the 
consequences of an under-allocation and over-allocation to growth assets in their 
superannuation accounts. Third, in choosing an appropriate asset allocation, 
superannuation members need to take all individual-specific characteristics into account 
when selecting a retirement investment strategy. Finally, fund trustees should approach 
the issue of offering life-cycle products as a superannuation default option with care, as 
they are required to exercise their responsibilities in the best interests of members. 
A potential limitation of this thesis is the nature of the sample studied. The 
sample includes four of Australia's larger industry superannuation funds (HESTA, STA, 
GESB & UniSuper). There are a total of 92 industry superannuation funds in Australia 
(Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 2006), so the sample is not completely 
representative of the industry superannuation funds sector and superannuation funds in 
general. Thus, observations and results are not necessarily reflective of all 
superannuation members. Also, as this thesis is concerned with the portfolio decisions 
(equity participation and equity allocation) of superannuation members in an Australian 
context only, then the findings may not be applicable to retirement participants in other 
countries. 
In terms of suggestions for further research in the area of age-based asset 
allocation, there are a number of potential areas to be explored. It would be interesting 
to extend this thesis to consider the expenses associated with life-cycle funds and of the 
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services provided by these funds. Another possible study concerning life-cycle funds 
would entail a comparison of life-cycle funds and other investment vehicles in terms of 
the differential fees across these investment options. 
Applying a similar regression analysis to the member asset allocation data for a 
larger number of Australian superannuation funds would provide findings that more 
accurately reflect the retirement savings behaviour of Australian superannuation fund 
members in general. 
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Table 2 
Sue.erannuation Fund Investment Strategy Choices 
HESTA STA GESB UniSuper 
Cash Plus Balanced Cash Plan Cash 
High Conservative Capital 
Core Pool Growth Plan Stable 
Sustainable Balanced Conservative 
Shares Plus Balanced Plan Balanced 
Readymade 
Options Eco Pool Stable Growth Plan Balanced 
O'seas Share Capital 
Pool Guaranteed Growth 
Aust Share 
Pool SR Shares 
Shares 
Cash Cash Cash Cash 
Fixed 
Interest; 
Inflation 
AustFixed Linked 
Interest; Bonds; 
Fixed Int'l Fixed Global 
Interest Fixed Interest Interest Bonds 
Aust 
Property; 
Int'l 
Property Property Pro2erty Property 
Asset Aust Shares; 
Classes Int'l Shares; 
Aust 
Sustainable 
Shares; Int'l 
Aust Shares; Sustainable Aust Shares; 
Shares Int'l Shares Shares Int'l Shares 
Absolute 
Return Absolute 
Strategy Return 
Funds; Strategy 
Commodities; Funds; 
Private Private 
Equity; Equity; 
Other Infrastructure Infrastucture 
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APPENDIXC 
Table 1 
Average Asset Allocations by Group- Full Sample Excluding Readymade Option 
This table presents statistics for average member asset allocations, showing the average 
percentage of the superannuation held in cash, fixed interest, property, shares, and 
'other'. Observations are sorted by age only, and gender and age. Excludes observations 
where members adopt only one readymade option as opposed to a do-it-yourself 
strategy, or a mixture ofboth the readymade oEtion and the do-it-yourself strategy. 
Obs Cash F.Interest Pro,eerty Shares Other 
ALL (Excluding 53233 9.84 15.58 15.25 53.02 6.32 
Readl:_made) 
AGE: 
<36 21666 10.35 15.30 13.99 54.16 6.21 
36-42 9891 8.28 16.04 14.98 54.94 5.76 
43-48 6319 7.43 13.01 17.87 55.22 6.46 
49-54 5893 8.87 17.50 16.57 50.99 6.06 
55+ 4371 14.21 21.13 15.51 43.72 5.42 
Unknown 5093 11.01 12.07 16.12 52.07 8.74 
GENDER: 
Male 21108 8.80 17.83 14.45 53.39 5.53 
<36 9485 8.97 17.06 13.39 54.67 5.90 
36-42 3363 7.33 16.40 14.63 56.40 5.24 
43-48 3637 7.15 17.54 15.96 53.98 5.36 
49-54 2499 8.50 19.06 15.72 51.52 5.20 
55+ 2123 13.53 22.56 14.86 44.05 5.00 
Age unknown 1 2.95 10.40 12.95 66.55 7.15 
Female 27022 10.43 14.48 15.70 52.91 6.48 
<36 12173 11.43 13.92 14.45 53.75 6.45 
36-42 4260 8.69 12.81 16.20 55.74 6.57 
43-48 4948 8.32 13.62 17.13 54.31 6.62 
49-54 3393 9.15 16.35 17.20 50.60 6.70 
55+ 2248 14.85 19.79 16.13 43.40 5.81 
Gender unknown 5103 10.99 12.07 16.12 52.09 8.73 
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Table 2 
Average Asset Allocations by Group -Restricted Sample Excluding Readymade Option 
This table presents statistics for average member asset allocations, showing the average 
percentage of the superannuation held in cash, fixed interest, property, shares, and 
'other'. Observations are sorted by age only, and gender and age. Excludes observations 
where members adopt only one readymade option as opposed to a do-it-yourself 
strategy, or a mixture of both the readymade option and the do-it-yourself strategy. 
Obs Cash F.Interest Pro,eerty Shares Other 
ALL (Excluding 490 8.84 17.37 22.44 42.75 11.45 
Readl:made) 
AGE: 
<36 93 5.76 14.92 19.96 48.98 15.56 
36-42 96 6.43 13.39 26.35 45.59 13.42 
43-48 101 7.02 13.97 24.41 46.77 10.42 
49-54 98 5.34 19.68 23.01 43.75 10.74 
55+ 102 19.07 24.51 18.53 29.45 8.97 
GENDER: 
Male 213 8.72 14.70 19.86 47.55 12.53 
<36 47 4.82 14.32 18.35 52.03 16.99 
36-42 43 3.20 11.94 22.45 49.32 16.08 
43-48 52 5.28 13.31 23.05 53.19 7.47 
49-54 32 4.20 11.81 16.33 57.62 15.30 
55+ 39 27.78 22.42 17.45 24.42 8.83 
Female 272 9.06 19.71 24.31 39.00 10.41 
<36 46 6.71 15.55 21.62 45.87 14.29 
36-42 53 9.05 14.57 29.51 42.55 9.53 
43-48 49 8.86 14.66 25.85 39.96 13.07 
49-54 66 5.89 23.50 26.25 37.03 8.97 
55+ 58 14.69 27.68 18.18 31.74 7.98 
Unknown 5 2.00 4.00 31.00 42.00 21.00 
MARITAL 
STATUS: 
Married/De-facto 343 9.69 17.01 21.52 43.91 10.68 
Unmarried 145 6.84 17.99 24.76 39.97 13.27 
Unknown 2 7.50 35.00 12.50 45.00 0.00 
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